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ZOMBIE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Elizabeth Sepper
ABSTRACT—This Article uncovers and names a phenomenon of pressing
importance for healthcare policy and religious liberty law: the rise of zombie
religious institutions—organizations that have contractual commitments to
religious identity but lack actual attachments to churches or associations of
religious people. Contracts create religion—sometimes in perpetuity—for
institutions that are not, or never have been, religious and for providers who
do not share the institution’s religious precepts. This Article details religion’s
spread across healthcare through affiliations, mergers, and—most
surprisingly—sales of hospitals that continue religious practice after their
connection to a church ends. These contracts require hospitals—secular and
religious, public and private, for-profit and nonprofit—to comply with
religious tenets. “Religious” institutions far removed from the paradigm of
the church populate the marketplace. In this way, private law impedes public
policy, expanding the universe of institutions eligible for religious
exemption from otherwise applicable laws. Moreover, as the category of
religious institution loses its specialness, theories of religious
institutionalism founder. The presumption of autonomy of religious
institutions from regulation cannot survive in the marketplace where
religious identity can be bought and sold.
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INTRODUCTION
West Suburban Hospital is a zombie religious institution. It does not
unite a community of religious people. It is disconnected from any church.
Located in Oak Park, Illinois, a suburb of Chicago, West Suburban was an
independent community hospital when Catholic Resurrection Health sought
to purchase it in 2004.1 Its medical staff did not share the Catholic values of
the buyer; indeed, they opposed religious restrictions on their treatment of
patients. The sale, however, ultimately went through.2 West Suburban
became Catholic. Just five years later, West Suburban was sold to a for-profit
investor. By the terms of the sale, the now-for-profit hospital will not be
listed as Catholic and must remove crucifixes and religious art.3 Nonetheless,
it remains obligated to prohibit the performance of abortions and
sterilizations.4 Based on five years of Catholic ownership in its almost 100year history, West Suburban became perpetually bound to Catholic
restrictions.5 By contract, this previously secular institution became
religious. Once sold, the religious institution survived in zombie form—
1
Marty Stempniak, West Sub Sold to MacNeal Owner, OAKPARK.COM (published Nov. 24, 2009,
2:06 PM; updated Dec. 1, 2009, 10:10 PM), http://www.oakpark.com/News/Articles/12-1-2009/WestSub-sold-to-MacNeal-owner [https://perma.cc/6E3Q-PDE5].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Edwin Yohnka, A Bad Deal for Health Care in Illinois, HUFFINGTON POST (published May 20,
2010, 6:42 PM; updated May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/edwin-yohnka/a-bad-deal-forhealth-car_b_584000.html [https://perma.cc/F3LG-79PB].
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lacking a live connection to religion but contractually committed to religious
identity.
Zombie religious institutions have emerged at a moment when law and
theory have taken a distinctly institutional turn. This new religious
institutionalism places institutions—not individuals—at the core of religious
liberty and grants them a special status in the social order.6 The doctrinal
high-water mark is the 2012 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& School v. EEOC decision, in which the Supreme Court carved out a
constitutional sphere of substantial autonomy from regulation for religious
institutions through a doctrine known as the ministerial exception.7
Encouraged by Hosanna-Tabor, a number of legal scholars advocate
granting near-absolute immunity from governmental regulation to
churches—defined to encompass at least some commercial entities.8
The Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc. shed additional light on this problem.9 In a challenge to the Affordable
Care Act’s mandate that insurance plans cover contraception, the Supreme
Court held that closely held for-profit corporations could promote religion
like nonprofit religious organizations and were equally entitled to religious
accommodation.10 Ascribing religion to the for-profit corporation—that is, a
nexus of contracts11¾the Court’s decision further raised the stakes for
religious institutionalism.12
6
See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the
Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 293 (2008) (“[A]n appropriately institutional approach to the
Religion Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of religious entities . . . .”).
7
565 U.S. 171, 179, 188 (2012) (holding that religious institutions need not comply with the
Americans with Disabilities Act with regard to employees who are “ministers”).
8
See generally Paul Horwitz, Freedom of the Church Without Romance, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 59, 59–60 (2013); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of the Church (New Revised Standard Version),
21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 335, 338 (2013); Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of
the Church?, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 249, 249–50
(Austin Sarat ed., 2012). For responses, see Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the Church” and the
Authority of the State, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 145, 146 (2013), and Richard C. Schragger & Micah
Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the Church, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
15, 16 (2013).
9
134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
10
Id. at 2759.
11
See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (setting out this theory
of the firm); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311 (1976) (discussing
corporation as nexus of contracts).
12
Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE
L.J. 769, 778 (2015) (observing that “tensions between religious exercise and commercial objectives
stand at the center of some of the most foundational church-state debates in the United States”); Nathan
B. Oman, The Need for a Law of Church and Market, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 141, 143 (2015) (“[W]e lack
a clear set of theories and metaphors specifying what role, if any, religion should play in commerce.”).
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Using healthcare as its case study, this Article argues that when religion
and commerce combine, commercial transactions shape religious
compliance and identity. As religious identity spreads through contract,
“religious” institutions far removed from the paradigm of the church
populate the marketplace. Secular, for-profit, and government institutions
can become religious and eligible for legislative and judicial exemptions
from regulation. This contracting of religion—the rise of zombie religious
institutions in particular—exposes the weakness in the theory of religious
institutionalism, which would allow institutions the authority to define their
boundaries and the autonomy to avoid state regulation. As ever-wider
categories of institutions become eligible for exemption, the concept of a
religious institution comes under strain.
Part I of the Article describes an important phenomenon: private law
has worked to create religious compliance—sometimes in perpetuity—in
facilities that are not, or never have been, religious and by providers who do
not share the institution’s religious precepts. This Article looks to the
experience of healthcare because the religious hospital has long served as the
exemplar of the religious institution flourishing in commerce.13 Through
contract, healthcare facilities identified as secular, affiliated with other faiths,
or operated as public hospitals assume new religious obligations and
privileges. Healthcare systems with names like “Optima” and hospitals with
names like “Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital” come to require providers’
obedience to religious doctrine.14 Distinctions between secular and religious,
public and private, and nonprofit and for-profit no longer hold.

13

Helen M. Alvaré, Religious Freedom Versus Sexual Expression: A Guide, 30 J.L. & RELIGION
475, 483, 485–86 (2015) (discussing hospitals as exemplars of Catholic religious institutions and
ministry); Kent Greenawalt, Objections in Conscience to Medical Procedures: Does Religion Make a
Difference?, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 824 (“Although it is somewhat difficult to say what gives a
collective entity an objection in conscience, we do understand that a hospital that is run by a religious
group has a powerful reason not to allow actions on its premises that the religion regards as murder or as
another serious moral wrong.”); Ana Smith Iltis, Institutional Integrity in Roman Catholic Health Care
Institutions, 7 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 95, 98–102 (2001) (addressing concerns about integrity of Catholic
healthcare institutions as they face the challenges of a secular, pluralistic, market-driven economy); Roger
Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 939, 964 (2007) (listing hospitals as among “religious institutions [that] have enjoyed wide latitude
in choosing which religiously motivated services and facilities to provide and to whom they will be
provided”); Susan J. Stabile, When Conscience Clashes with State Law and Policy: Catholic Institutions,
46 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 137, 144 (2017) (“[W]hen a Catholic organization cares for the elderly or the
sick, or provides for education, it is performing an act as religious as those that take place inside a church
building.”).
14
RELIAS, Health System Bans Abortions in Facilities, MED. ETHICS ADVISOR (Apr. 1, 1998),
https://www.ahcmedia.com/articles/59254-health-system-bans-abortions-in-facilities
[https://perma.cc/29F4-LDZN] (reporting that, following the merger of Catholic Medical Center and
Elliot Hospital into Optima Healthcare, abortion was prohibited at both facilities); see also Brownfield v.
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The expansion of religious restrictions and identity is not limited to
ongoing relationships between religious and secular institutions. By the
terms of their sales, formerly religious hospitals maintain a religious identity.
In other instances, hospitals lose their religious affiliation after sale but
continue their compliance with religious rules. Zombie religious hospitals—
removed of the leadership or mission that might have given them special
status as religious institutions—carry on.
Part II contends that private law impedes public policy by expanding
the universe of institutions eligible for religious exemption from law. The
growing number of institutions adopting religious identity belies a
fundamental assumption of legislative and judicial exemptions: that religious
objections will not be so numerous or categorical as to thwart the state’s
goals. To the extent that contracts of religious compliance demand behavior
below standards set by generally applicable laws, they do not promote
corporate social responsibility but instead effectively immunize secular, forprofit, and government institutions from employee and consumer
protections.
Part III argues that the combination of commerce and religion
destabilizes the theory of religious institutionalism that seemed triumphant
after Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby. Religious institutionalists ground
their claims to broad institutional autonomy from regulation on values of
pluralism and voluntarism. According to this view, robust institutional
protection leads to the flourishing of diverse institutions, alternative sources
of authority, and individual liberty. But in the marketplace, powerful
economic entities may reduce pluralism, both religious and secular.
Institutions gain faith through commercial transaction instead of organic
development. They unite individuals through contract, not devotion. In this
way, the healthcare market realizes fears articulated by several courts in the
1980s that, having been granted religious exemptions, religious institutions
might “extend their influence and propagate their faith by entering the
commercial, profit-making world.”15
Contracting religion—and the zombie institutions it generates—makes
the crisis acute. As religious institutions blur the lines between for-profit and
nonprofit, commercial and noncommercial, and sacred and secular, the
category of religious institution loses its specialness. Any institution can
Daniel Freeman Marina Hosp., 256 Cal. Rptr. 240, 242 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (considering claim by rape
victim against Catholic hospital for denying emergency contraception and counseling).
15
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 337 (1987) (dismissing this concern of the district court); see also King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC,
498 F.2d 51, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (noting that Title VII’s religious employer exemption “is a sure formula
for concentrating and vastly extending the worldly influence of those religious sects having the wealth
and inclination to buy up pieces of the secular economy”).
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become religious. Under such circumstances, courts may replace their handsoff approach to religious identity and doctrine with more searching and
skeptical analysis. Legislatures may revisit and rethink the enterprise of
institutional exemption. In so doing, they may reduce the liberty that the
doctrine grants to religious institutions and perhaps to religious exercise
more broadly.
I.

THE MARKET FOR RELIGIOUS COMPLIANCE AND IDENTITY

This Part argues that commercial transactions are creating religious
institutions far removed from the paradigm of church or religious
association. This account focuses on healthcare, due to the degree to which
the sector has combined religion and commerce, and on Catholic healthcare
in particular, due to its large market share and extensive religious
requirements. It illuminates three orders of institutions: original religious
institutions, contracting partners or affiliates, and zombie religious
institutions. While churches are uncontestably first-order institutions,
officially designated religious nonprofit hospitals have long been considered
exemplars of religious institutionalism. As Section I.A describes, these
original institutions themselves have changed in commerce and have become
largely indistinguishable from their secular competitors. Further along the
spectrum, as Section I.B shows, we find contracting partners engaged in a
variety of ongoing relationships with religious institutions. Mergers, joint
ventures, and partnerships commit institutions that are public, secular, or
affiliated with other faiths to comply with Catholic doctrine. Finally, as
Section I.C argues, provisions in sales contracts and restrictive covenants in
deeds perpetuate religious identity in formerly Catholic facilities long after
ownership has changed. Zombie religious institutions emerge, even as the
justifications for religious identity—the affiliation with a religious body or
the religious beliefs of founders, directors, or employees—no longer remain.
A. Evolution of Catholic Healthcare Institutions
The healthcare landscape includes many faith traditions, including
Orthodox Jewish nursing homes, Christian Science centers, Presbyterian
hospitals, and more. Catholic healthcare, however, dwarfs all other religious
healthcare providers combined. In a market where approximately 59% of
hospitals are nonprofit, Catholic healthcare systems are four of the ten largest
nonprofit systems.16 There are 548 officially designated Catholic hospitals,

16
LOIS UTTLEY & CHRISTINE KHAIKIN, MERGERWATCH, GROWTH OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND
HEALTH SYSTEMS: 2016 UPDATE OF THE MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE REPORT 2, 8 (2016),
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/27061007/1465224862580/M
[https://perma.cc/DDK4-
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which constitute approximately 14.5% of the national market17 but over 40%
of acute care beds in five states and over 30% in five other states.18
Officially designated Catholic hospitals have a sponsoring religious
order and identify as an extension of the Church.19 They require governance
and provision of care in accordance with the Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services (ERDs).20 According to these directives, a
Catholic institution must “distinguish itself by service” to those in need, act
as “a responsible steward of the health care resources available to it,” and
“treat its employees respectfully and justly,” including through “just
compensation and benefits” and “recognition of the rights of employees to
organize and bargain collectively without prejudice to the common good.”21
Within Catholic healthcare facilities, all providers must comply with
religious restrictions on care.22 Assisted reproductive technology, abortion,
contraception, condoms, sterilization, and treatments derived from fetal
tissue or embryonic stem cells are not permitted.23 Under the ERDs, patients
may only be informed of “morally legitimate alternatives.”24 And where
patients have made a decision about the use or withdrawal of artificial life
support, their wishes will not be honored if they are contrary to Catholic
teaching.25
These modern Catholic healthcare facilities are frequently considered
first-order religious institutions, not unlike churches or church-run charities.
Today, however, they bear little resemblance to such noncommercial
religious entities. In the early days of Catholic healthcare, women religious
provided nursing care and served as administrators, overseeing daily
HMUB]. Catholic healthcare has 1600 long-term and other health facilities. About CHA, CATHOLIC
HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., https://www.chausa.org/about [https://perma.cc/33TK-RVE3].
17
UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
18
Id. at 1.
19
See J. Stuart Showalter & John L. Miles, Restructuring Health Care Organizations While
Retaining Recognition as a Catholic Institution, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1111, 1125–26, 1131 (1988).
20
See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (5th ed. 2009), http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-lifeand-dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-Care-Services-fifthedition-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM2L-WL4X] [hereinafter ERDs].
21
Id. at 11–12 (ERDs 1, 3, 6, and 7).
22
Id. at 12 (“Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives as policy [and] require
adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment . . . .”).
23
See id. at 25–27, 33 (ERDs 38-41, 45, 48, 52, 53, and 66).
24
Id. at 20 (ERD 27).
25
See id. at 31 (“The free and informed judgment made by a competent adult patient concerning the
use or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures should always be respected and normally complied with,
unless it is contrary to Catholic moral teaching.”). With regard to artificial nutrition and hydration, the
ERDs impose “an obligation to provide patients with food and water,” even when they are in “chronic
and presumably irreversible conditions.” Id. (ERD 58).
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operations.26 Hospitals would operate as charities, providing care to the poor
and securing financing from private donations.27 Over the course of the last
century, this model of religious healthcare institution—owned, operated, and
directed by women religious—disappeared.
By the mid-twentieth century, with scientific advances in antisepsis and
new funding from private health insurance and federal financing, Catholic
healthcare institutions no longer primarily served charity patients or
depended on donations.28 The enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965
cemented these changes.29 Today, virtually all funding of Catholic healthcare
comes from government funds and private insurers.30 In terms of
sophistication of care, competition over prices, and levels of charitable care,
Catholic hospitals resemble their secular nonprofit and for-profit
competitors.31
As vocations of women religious declined, the staffing and governance
of Catholic healthcare also evolved. Members of religious orders came to
have little to no patient interaction and to sponsor “systems in markets in
which they no longer have—or never did have—an active presence.”32
Hospitals that had existed as parts of their sponsoring religious organizations
26
See Barbra Mann Wall, The Role of Catholic Nurses in Women’s Health Care Policy Disputes: A
Historical Study, 61 NURSING OUTLOOK 367, 368 (2013) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of Catholic
hospitals in America were established and originally managed by women.”).
27
See BARBRA MANN WALL, AMERICAN CATHOLIC HOSPITALS: A CENTURY OF CHANGING
MARKETS AND MISSIONS 9 (2011).
28
See Showalter & Miles, supra note 19, at 1117–19.
29
See Donald H.J. Hermann, Religiously Affiliated Health Care Providers: Legal Structures and
Transformations, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF IDENTITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE LAW 727, 727 (James A. Serritella et al. eds., 2006).
30
LOIS UTTLEY & RONNIE PAWELKO, MERGERWATCH, NO STRINGS ATTACHED: PUBLIC FUNDING
OF
RELIGIOUSLY-SPONSORED HOSPITALS IN THE UNITED STATES 13, 15 (2002),
http://www.mergerwatch.org/storage/pdf-files/bp_no_strings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ET8E-V9P6]
(finding that in one representative state, charitable donations amounted to 0.0015% of revenue for
religious hospitals).
31
See, e.g., CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
1
(Jan.
2013),
https://www.chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/mini_profile-pdf
[https://perma.cc/99Z2-H2XW] (showing a similar service mix at Catholic and other nonprofit hospitals
with the exception of a few services, including palliative care, that are more common in Catholic
hospitals); LOIS UTTLEY ET AL., MERGERWATCH & ACLU, MISCARRIAGE OF MEDICINE: THE GROWTH
OF CATHOLIC HOSPITALS AND THE THREAT TO REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE 12–13 (Dec. 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/growth-of-catholic-hospitals-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P529-Q2TW] (reporting that Catholic-sponsored and -affiliated hospitals provide
disproportionately less charity care than do public hospitals and other religious nonprofit hospitals and
less care for Medicaid patients than any other type of hospital); Ann Kutney-Lee et al., Distinct Enough?
A National Examination of Catholic Hospital Affiliation and Patient Perceptions of Care, 39 HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REV. 134, 134 (2014) (reporting that “patients treated in Catholic hospitals appear to rate
their hospital experience similar to patients treated in non-Catholic hospitals”).
32
Lawrence E. Singer, Does Mission Matter?, 6 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 347, 348 (2006).
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formed separate corporate entities.33 Laypeople became directors and
administrators of these hospitals.34
In the absence of shared religious ties to personnel, formal mechanisms
of control were put in place. In Catholic hospital structures, the religious
orders frequently remained members of the nonprofit corporation and
retained authority over fundamental corporate changes¾including anything
affecting religious mission¾but boards of directors exercised general
governance authority and oversight.35 Local bishops assumed a greater role
in supervising healthcare institutions and policing compliance with the ERDs
in response (at least partly) to the lack of religious administrators and staff.36
B. Spread of Religion to Non-Catholic Healthcare
Over the past few decades, Catholic healthcare systems have increased
in size and scope by acquiring, affiliating with, and merging with nonCatholic hospitals and other facilities.37 Whereas Catholic hospitals merged
with one another in the 1980s, they became willing to deal with non-Catholic
hospitals as a new wave of consolidation swept the nation in the 1990s.38
Over the course of that decade, 171 mergers (and many affiliations) took
place between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals.39 After its enactment in
2010, the Affordable Care Act fueled another frenzy of consolidation.40
These commercial transactions have blurred the lines between religious
and nonreligious entities. In a merger or acquisition, the Catholic and nonCatholic hospitals become a single entity.41 This entity may or may not be
33
Michael J. DeBoer, Religious Hospitals and the Federal Community Benefit Standard—Counting
Religious Purpose as a Tax-Exemption Factor for Hospitals, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1549, 1565–66
(2012).
34
WALL, supra note 27, at 5.
35
DeBoer, supra note 33, at 1566.
36
Leonard J. Nelson, III, God and Woman in the Catholic Hospital, 31 J. LEGIS. 69, 124 (2004).
37
UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 4 (documenting mergers from 2001 to 2011); WALL, supra note
27, at 19 (discussing the merger trend of the 1990s); Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious
Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 1434 (1995) (“Although the
1980s witnessed many mergers among Catholic facilities, the realities of the 1990s have necessitated the
consolidation of Catholic with non-Catholic facilities.”).
38
Carol S. Weisman et al., The Implications of Affiliations Between Catholic and Non-Catholic
Health Care Organizations for Availability of Reproductive Health Services, 9 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES
121, 126–27 (1999).
39
Rachel Benson Gold, Hierarchy Crackdown Clouds Future of Sterilization, EC Provision at
Catholic Hospitals, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., May 2002, at 11, 11 http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/
tgr/05/2/gr050211.pdf [http://perma.cc/6FSB-JF44].
40
Leemore Dafny, Hospital Industry Consolidation — Still More to Come?, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED.
198, 198 (2014).
41
Kenneth R. White, Hospitals Sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church: Separate, Equal, and
Distinct?, 78 MILBANK Q. 213, 227–28 (2000).
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Catholic. The non-Catholic hospital likewise may be officially designated as
Catholic42 or may keep its non-Catholic identity. Irrespective of the
designation, mergers invariably result in secular entities abiding by Catholic
doctrine.43 Similarly, joint ventures in which both parties contribute capital
to create a new separate entity or line of business may require that the joint
venture adopt a religious identity.44
In looser affiliations like partnerships, management agreements, or
leases, each healthcare corporation typically maintains its own identity.45 The
Catholic partner has no ownership stake in the partnering facility, lessee, or
joint venturer. Yet these healthcare facilities denominated as secular,
identified with a non-Catholic religion, or considered public have agreed to
Catholic religious restrictions on care.
Joint efforts may result in system-wide religious restrictions. For
example, in the mid-1990s, secular Elliot Hospital entered into a partnership
called Optima Health with Catholic Medical Center in Manchester, New
Hampshire.46 Despite promises to doctors that all treatments could continue
at Elliot, Optima banned abortions to comply with the directives.47 Similarly,
in order for two Catholic hospitals to participate in a regional consortium in
St. Petersburg, Florida, the six nonsectarian hospitals reportedly had to ban
abortion, in vitro fertilization, and sterilization and permit a nun to review
their end-of-life policies.48
42

Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 125 (providing examples).
See LIZ BUCAR, CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, WHEN CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC
HOSPITALS
MERGE:
REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH
COMPROMISED
33-50
(1998),
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/1998reprohealthcompromised.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7J58-84WB] (documenting many mergers between 1990 and 1997 resulting in nonCatholic hospital discontinuing services); Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 132–33 (reporting the end of
abortion care in case studies, none of which “involved an instance of a non-Catholic organization
assuming Catholic identity as a result of affiliation” or the merger of Catholic and non-Catholic
organizations into a Catholic entity); Carol M. Ostrom, Hospitals’ Proposed Affiliation with Catholic
Systems Opposed, SEATTLE TIMES (published Apr. 27, 2013, 8:00 PM; updated Apr. 27, 2013, 10:01 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/hospitalsrsquo-proposed-affiliation-with-catholic-systemsopposed [http://perma.cc/6ZKD-ZAA8] (reporting that after acquisition by Catholic Franciscan, Highline
Medical Center in Washington remained secular but subject to the ERDs).
44
Therese Cox, Sisters to Establish Charity Foundation with Profits, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
Mar. 5, 1996, at 04D (reporting that a fifty–fifty joint venture between St. Joseph’s Hospital and for-profit
Columbia/HCA resulted in a ban on abortions and sterilizations within the jointly owned facility).
45
UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16; Weisman et al., supra note 38, at 123.
46
Alison Manolovici Cody, Success in New Jersey: Using the Charitable Trust Doctrine to Preserve
Women’s Reproductive Services When Hospitals Become Catholic, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 323,
344–45 (2000).
47
Id.
48
Wes Allison & Bryan Gilmer, Bayfront to Leave BayCare, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Oct. 24,
2000),
http://www.sptimes.com/News/102400/TampaBay/Bayfront_to_leave_Bay.shtml
[http://perma.cc/GU2T-AWTK].
43
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Religious–religious affiliations also generate compliance with Catholic
rules by non-Catholic partners. For example, Hoag Presbyterian Hospital in
Newport Beach, California, entered into an agreement with St. Joseph Health
System to integrate care across their hospitals.49 The transaction purported to
maintain the partners’ respective faith identities. But, shortly thereafter,
Hoag announced a halt to nontherapeutic abortions.50 Similarly, when three
Baptist hospitals in Nashville, Tennessee, affiliated with St. Thomas
hospitals, the parties committed to “respect and preserve the heritage,
mission and values of both faith-based organizations.”51 Yet the Baptist
hospitals agreed to offer only medical services “consistent with Catholic
canonical law.”52 For the next eleven years, “Baptist Hospital” of Nashville
operated under the ERDs.53
Public hospitals also have come under religious restrictions when they
affiliate, however loosely, with a religious hospital or healthcare system.54 In
Washington, a number of public health districts have partnered with Catholic
healthcare systems. In San Juan County, one such district replaced the public
clinic and hospital with a new facility run under contract with the district by
Catholic PeaceHealth.55 Although the public district covered one-third of its
construction costs and uses property taxes to partially subsidize its
operations, Peace Island Medical Center restricts services according to

49
Jill Cowan, Hoag Hospital Can Refuse Elective Abortions, State Rules, L.A. TIMES: L.A. NOW
(Apr. 4, 2014, 3:45 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-hoag-abortions-20140404story.html [http://perma.cc/YW68-JHDG].
50
Id.
51
Nicki Pendleton Wood, Letter Confirms Baptist Planned Sale to St. Thomas and Ascension Health,
NASHVILLEPOST.COM
(May
7,
2001),
https://www.nashvillepost.com/news/2001/5/6/
letter_confirms_baptist_planned_sale_to_st_thomas_and_ascension_health
[https://perma.cc/2PNCSCFX].
52
Id.
53
See St. Thomas Health Renaming Baptist, Other Hospitals, WSMV (published July 11, 2013, 5:20
AM; updated July 25, 2013, 5:20 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/22812676/st-thomas-expected-torename [https://perma.cc/XT3Y-7LLQ].
54
UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 16. Management contracts may involve religious-public partners
as well. See, e.g., Michael Romano, Healthcare Hath No Fury, MOD. HEALTHCARE, July 21, 2003, 6, 6
(noting that Baptist Health Systems of Alabama split ownership of Cullman Regional Medical Center
fifty-fifty with the Health Care Authority of Cullman County); Shannon Muchmore, Mercy Health
System Chosen to Manage OSU Medical Center, TULSA WORLD (Apr. 1, 2014),
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/health/mercy-health-system-chosen-to-manage-osu-medicalcenter/article_ec04df9d-75bb-5db6-ad83-a1a89376fb9f.html [https://perma.cc/6B6C-TR8J] (reporting
that a Catholic healthcare system will manage Oklahoma State University Medical Center, “the primary
hospital for Tulsa’s indigent residents” with 25,000 patient visits annually).
55
Aaron Corvin, ACLU Says Faith-Based Hospitals Jeopardize Reproductive, End-of-Life Care,
COLUMBIAN (Mar. 23, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.columbian.com/news/2013/mar/24/
ACLU-faith-based-hospitals-jeopardize-care [https://perma.cc/U3WZ-WSED].
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religious doctrine.56 In Austin, Texas, a Catholic hospital entered into a lease
and management contract with Brackenridge, the public hospital primarily
responsible for the city’s indigent care.57 The lease agreement made clear that
Brackenridge would retain ownership and the facility would not be identified
as Catholic.58 Nevertheless, it requires the public hospital to turn away
women seeking emergency contraception and refer them to a public clinic
instead.59 Other proposed public–Catholic hospital affiliations have fallen
apart due to concerns over healthcare access and Establishment Clause
limitations.60
C. Development of Zombie Catholic Hospitals
Religious identity can survive even after commercial relationships end.
As hospitals have been sold, religious identity has persisted. Provisions in
asset purchase agreements and restrictive covenants in deeds continue
religious identity and/or restrictions after a facility has changed hands from
a Catholic seller to a secular (and frequently for-profit) buyer. In a
phenomenon that seems to date to the 1990s, hospitals maintain their
religious identity under the terms of sales agreements.61 These zombie
Catholic hospitals claim Catholic identity even as they further no charitable
mission, grant no role to religious orders, and have no Catholic ownership.
In other instances, zombie hospitals have no Catholic identity but continue
to comply with religious rules.62
56

Id.
Barbra Mann Wall, Conflict and Compromise: Catholic and Public Hospital Partnerships,
18 NURSING HIST. REV. 100, 100–01 (2010).
58
Id. at 101.
59
Id. at 110–11.
60
See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF KY., PROPOSED CONSOLIDATION OF JEWISH HOSPITAL
HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC.: REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL 10, 13 (2011),
[hereinafter REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL] http://www.modernhealthcare.com/
Assets/pdf/CH769761230.PDF [https://perma.cc/42X8-W6H5] (expressing constitutional and policy
concerns over proposed affiliation between University Medical Center of the public University of
Louisville and a Catholic system because although the public entities would not be “identified or treated
as a ‘Catholic’ institution” they agreed to prohibit services in accordance with religious directives); Arthur
B. LaFrance, Merger of Religious and Public Hospitals: Render unto Caesar, 3 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
229 (2004) (recounting litigation over the proposed merger of a governmental hospital district—a
municipal corporation operating a hospital and several clinics—in Oregon and Catholic Providence
Health System, with the agreement committing the parties to respect the ERDs).
61
BUCAR, supra note 43, at 49–50 (documenting ten sales resulting in zombie Catholic hospitals
from 1990 to 1997).
62
See, e.g., Cinda Becker, Pennsylvania Pacts: Catholic Health East Agrees to Sell Pair of
Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20071119/
MAGAZINE/71116003 [https://perma.cc/EW2L-9274] (reporting on the purchase of Mercy Jeannette by
secular Excela Health, according to which the hospital will be renamed Excela Health Westmoreland
Hospital but follow Catholic teachings).
57
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The primary reason that religious compliance persists is that Catholic
sellers take the position that at least some commitment to restrictions from
buyers is nonnegotiable.63 Asset purchase agreements incorporate the ERDs
as provisions enforceable like any other contract term.64 The agreements
often require decades or an eternity of compliance.65
The new owners of formerly religiously affiliated facilities often have
no religious or moral objection to these health services. Indeed, they may
provide them at other facilities. They agree to the provisions for a variety of
reasons. First, they may value the religious name—whose use is contingent
on maintaining religious restrictions or identity. Second, some for-profit
chains embrace religious compliance to break into a new market.66 Third,
some buyers may welcome having a reason to prohibit performance of
procedures that invite controversy in particular markets. Fourth, as Part II
will show, buyers may also benefit financially from prior or ongoing
religious exemptions.
An intriguing possibility also exists that non-Catholic buyers may
receive a discount for credible commitment to ERDs. Catholic nonprofits
previously paid substantially less to purchase a Catholic hospital than would
for-profit or other nonprofit buyers.67 This selective discounting, researchers
hypothesized, could be explained by the fact that Catholic buyers “can

63
See Spencer L. Durland, Note, The Case Against Institutional Conscience, 86 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1655, 1665 (2011) (“Reverend F. Patrick Hanser stated the position as follows: ‘If we would have
had to compromise any of our ethical or religious values or our Catholic identity, it would have been
better for us to close.’”); see also infra notes 256, 258.
64
CATHOLICS FOR A FREE CHOICE, MERGER TRENDS 2001: REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH CARE IN
CATHOLIC SETTINGS 11, 12 (2002), https://www.catholicsforchoice.org/topics/healthcare/documents/
2001mergertrends.pdf [https://perma.cc/92JX-HJYA] (documenting sales of thirteen Catholic hospitals
to for-profit healthcare systems with agreements to continued compliance with ERDs); SUSAN BERKE
FOGEL, MERGERWATCH, FIGHTING RELIGIOUS HEALTH RESTRICTIONS: PREVENTING THE
CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS WHEN RELIGIOUS HOSPITALS ARE SOLD 3 (2004),
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/816571/11352513/1300824208687/b
[https://perma.cc/5MCBEP7S] (documenting an additional seven such sales).
65
See FOGEL, supra note 64, at 10 (sale of Santa Marta Hospital to for-profit Star Healthcare Group
required adherence to the ERDs for 30 years); id. at 4 (“According to Richard Fiske of Tenet Healthcare,
most of the Tenet agreements with Catholic hospitals continue the Directives in perpetuity.”).
66
Melanie Evans, Exiting Two States[:] Catholic Health Partners Sheds Hospitals, Debt, MOD.
HEALTHCARE (May 9, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110509/MAGAZINE/
305099964 [https://perma.cc/Q2BF-D8EY] (explaining that in acquiring a Catholic hospital chain, forprofit Health Management Associates would gain a major market and complete its largest acquisition thus
far).
67
Paul Gertler & Jennifer Kuan, Does It Matter Who Your Buyer Is? The Role of Nonprofit Mission
in the Market for Corporate Control of Hospitals, 52 J.L. & ECON. 295, 302 (2009) (finding that
“religious nonprofits discount only to religious buyers” with a discount of about 48% and interpreting
“this differential discounting to mission, where, for example, a Catholic hospital selling to another
Catholic hospital can be confident that abortions will not be performed”).
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credibly commit to not performing abortions and other related actions”; the
discount thus was “the value to the Catholic seller of a broad set of hard-tocontract behaviors.”68 Today, however, Catholic sellers tend to contract with
secular buyers for precisely these behaviors.69 A recent empirical study
suggests that zombie Catholic hospitals may be commonplace; looking
across representative states, it found that the rate of performance of tubal
ligations—a procedure largely barred by the ERDs—did not increase after
Catholic hospitals were sold to non-Catholic buyers.70
For-profit buyers have agreed not only to continue Catholic restrictions
but also to assume the mantle of Catholic identity.71 Since the mid-1990s,
some for-profit systems—including Tenet Healthcare and Columbia/HCA
Healthcare—have adopted a strategy of actively marketing themselves as
willing to preserve religious identity in formerly Catholic facilities.72 Today,
for example, publicly traded Hospital Corporation of America holds out
several of its hospitals as part of the ministry of the Roman Catholic
Church.73
68
Id. at 296–97; see also Alan J. Meese & Nathan B. Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the
Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations Are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273, 293
(2014) (“Counter-parties may rely on religious observance as a low-cost signal of trustworthiness. To be
sure, the frequency of religious affinity fraud suggests that religion also can be used opportunistically,
but in many situations it is sufficiently accurate to be a rational response to more expensive systems of
sorting and monitoring.”).
69
Other faith traditions also contract to keep the religious identity of their hospitals alive following
a sale. For example, Parkview Adventist Medical Center in Maine accepted an offer of acquisition from
nonsectarian Mid Coast Health Services because it committed to “ensuring the faith-based care continue”
and to abiding by an “Adventist culture and value system.” Beth Brogan, Brunswick Hospital Leaders
Laud Merger, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2015, 4:35 PM), http://bangordailynews.com/2015/
08/21/business/brunswick-hospital-leaders-laud-merger [https://perma.cc/3EFF-AFLA]. Likewise, some
formerly Baptist hospitals operate in accordance with Baptist faith and require Baptist representation on
their boards. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 54.
70
Elaine L. Hill et al., Medically Necessary but Forbidden: Reproductive Health Care in CatholicOwned Hospitals 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23768, 2017),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w23768.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZN-LSMR].
71
Lisa Wangsness, Worcester’s For-Profit St. Vincent May Offer Peek at Boston Hospital’s Future,
TELEGRAM.COM (published Apr. 28, 2010, 9:36 AM; updated April 28, 2010, 1:26 PM),
http://www.telegram.com/article/20100428/NEWS/100429713&Template=printart
[https://perma.cc/993S-BXBU] (discussing for-profit health systems’ purchases of Catholic hospitals and
maintenance of “religious identity”); see supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text for the requirements
of officially designated Catholic hospitals.
72
Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe Is Not Enough: When Religion Controls
Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 731 (2004) (noting Tenet’s strategy); Lisa C. Ikemoto, When a
Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1094–95 (1996) (quoting a Columbia executive
as saying, “As the Catholic hospitals see Columbia as a joint-venture partner, they’ll want to have deals
where Rick (Scott, Columbia’s president and chief executive officer) and the pope have an equal vote”).
73
Gail Bulfin, Mercy Hospital to Be Sold to HCA Chain, ARCHDIOCESE OF MIAMI (July 23, 2010),
http://www.miamiarch.org/CatholicDiocese.php?op=Article_10713125945323 [https://perma.cc/6CA29DHZ].
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The result has been a peculiar institution: the for-profit, investor-owned
Catholic hospital.74 For example, after its sale to private equity firm Cerberus
Capital Management, the six-hospital Caritas Christi Health Care system in
Boston will maintain not only compliance with the ERDs but also official
designation as Catholic.75 Describing the agreement, the Wall Street Journal
remarked, “Catholic nuns, meet your new owners: A three-headed dog from
hell.”76 Sales of other hospitals to investment firms similarly have preserved
their official Catholic designation.77
Agreements for monitoring by local Catholic clergy have been
concluded as part of these sales.78 For example, parallel to the purchase
agreement with Caritas, Steward (the healthcare for-profit formed by
Cerberus) signed a “stewardship agreement” with the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Boston. According to its terms, “the Catholic identity of the
Caritas system is to be found in its adherence to the Directives and the
Catholic theological tradition” and in that “all Hospitals will be operated in
accordance with the moral, ethical and social teachings of the Roman

74
Melanie Evans, Ascension Looks to Chicago: Alexian Deal Would Be Area’s Latest Consolidation,
MOD.
HEALTHCARE
(May
2,
2011),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20110502/MAGAZINE/305029960 [https://perma.cc/36U7-KX46] (“Vanguard Health Systems, a forprofit chain based in Nashville[,] . . . counts the Blackstone Group, a private-equity firm, as a majority
owner . . . .”).
75
Press Release, Office of Att’y Gen. Martha Coakley, Statement of the Massachusetts Attorney
General as to the Caritas Christi Transaction 16 (Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/
nonprofit/caritas/statement-of-the-attorney-general-caritas-christi-transaction.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
WXP6-2NPK] [hereinafter Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement].
76
Gregory Corcoran, In Hospital Deal, How Much Is a Catholic Identity Worth? Just 3%, WALL ST.
J. (June 24, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/06/24/in-hospital-deal-how-much-is-acatholic-identity-worth-just-3 [https://perma.cc/BX3P-E4E3].
77
Sister Immacula Wendt, Holy Cross Keeping Catholic Identity, and Other Letters: Keeping Their
Religion, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20110228/
MAGAZINE/110229960 [https://perma.cc/YG95-5NAK] (reporting that Holy Cross of Chicago and St.
Vincent Hospital of Worcester, Massachusetts will “keep full Roman Catholic identity” after acquisition
by for-profit and have agreements to “preserve the charitable mission of the hospital and adhere to the
Catholic ethical and religious directives”).
78
See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. Hosps. & Sisters of Charity Health Sys., Sisters of Charity Health
System and University Hospitals Announce Plans to Transfer Sole Ownership of St. John Medical Center
in Westlake to UH (Aug. 31, 2015) (on file with author) (reporting the sale of St. John Medical Center in
Cleveland to University Hospitals with oversight by the bishop and “a mission and values committee to
ensure that all of the vital components of the hospital’s Catholic identity continue”); Press Release, Univ.
of Pittsburgh Schs. of the Health Scis., Attorney General Corbett Approves Agreement for Merger of
Mercy and UPMC (May 25, 2007), http://www.upmc.com/media/NewsReleases/2007/Pages/attorneygeneral-corbett-approves-agreement-for-merger-of-mercy-and-upmc.aspx
[https://perma.cc/J9SC9VZQ] (reporting the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center system’s purchase of 535-bed Mercy
Hospital, which “will continue to operate as a Catholic hospital, under the canonical oversight of the
Diocese of Pittsburgh”).
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Catholic Church as expressed in the Directives and as interpreted solely and
exclusively by” the archbishop.79
Under the agreement, an enforcement mechanism in the form of a $25
million “termination contribution” clause applies if the archbishop
determines that the for-profit owners have not lived up to their religion-based
obligations.80 In reviewing and approving the transfer of the hospitals, the
Attorney General concluded that the amount was “sufficiently high to deter
Steward from exercising its termination rights as a matter of convenience
rather than legitimate need.”81 The agreement acknowledges the possibility
that a hospital may be “obligated pursuant to a Legal Requirement to take
action” contrary to the ERDs.82 In such case, however, it purports to grant
the archbishop standing to challenge the legal requirement because of his
interest in maintaining the Catholic identity of the hospitals.83
While this agreement does not apply to future owners, it creates
substantial incentives for Steward to negotiate future compliance with the
Directives. In particular, it provides that if the hospitals are sold to or merge
with other institutions, Steward must pay $25 million to the archbishop. It
may forego payment, however, by securing commitment to the terms of the
religious stewardship agreement from any future purchaser.84
Other zombie Catholic hospital sales agreements explicitly bind the
facility with regard to future owners. For example, in purchasing Queen of
Angels/Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in Los Angeles, Tenet
agreed to abide by the ERDs from 1998 to 2018 and to ensure any subsequent
owners also followed the Directives until 2018.85 In some instances, property
law has played a role. In sales of land, restrictive covenants in deeds have
purported to forever prohibit the use of the property for sterilization,

79

Stewardship Agreement Between Steward and Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston Regarding
Caritas Christi 3 (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/nonprofit/caritas/executed-stewardshipagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DJL-E4L2] [hereinafter Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement].
80
Id. at 8, 12, 15.
81
Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement, supra note 75, at 27.
82
Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79, at 10.
83
Id.
84
The agreement states:
In the event of the sale, merger or other transfer of any Hospital (or any substantial portion of its
assets or operations) by Steward, either RCAB [Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston] or Steward
may terminate this Agreement with respect to such Hospital and its respective services in its sole
discretion . . . . If neither RCAB or Steward terminates this Agreement with respect to such
Hospital, Steward, as a condition of closing such sale, merger or other transfer, shall cause the
transferee to accept the obligations under this Agreement with respect to such Hospital in a form of
agreement reasonably satisfactory to RCAB and to which RCAB is a named party.
Id. at 13–14.
85
FOGEL, supra note 64, at 4–5.
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abortion, or assisted suicide.86 When Tenet purchased the Daniel Freeman
hospitals from a Catholic system, the asset purchase agreement specified that
the Directives would “run with the land,” applying as long as the property
included a healthcare facility.87
A for-profit joint venture between Ascension, the largest Catholic
healthcare system, and Oak Hill Capital Partners, a private investment firm,
also envisions constant Catholic compliance, irrespective of ownership.88
Although a minority owner with a 20% stake, the Catholic partner holds—
by the terms of the agreement—“sole authority in perpetuity over
compliance with interpretation and application of the Ethical and Religious
Directives . . . as well as all other elements of Catholic identity—for
example, charity care and community benefit.”89 The Catholicism of the forprofit venture purports to last eternally. According to Ascension, “no
ownership change in the company going forward can change” the Catholic
partner’s control.90
One might query whether zombie Catholic hospitals actually abide by
restrictions or claim Catholic identity once sold from the secular buyer to a
new owner. Information about subsequent sales is difficult to come by, in
part because sales of for-profits are less closely scrutinized than are deals
where a nonprofit hospital converts to for-profit status.91 But several
examples suggest religious compliance can persist. After buying two St.
Louis-area hospitals in 2001, Tenet negotiated with the subsequent purchaser
to preserve compliance with the ERDs.92 In Knoxville, Tennessee, Baptist
Health System was required to comply with Catholic doctrine and shut down
86
Associated Press, Hospital Links Its Policy on Abortion to Land Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/06/us/hospital-links-its-policy-on-abortion-to-land-deal.html
[https://perma.cc/B66E-QZUL] (reporting a deal in which Illinois Masonic Hospital agreed not to
perform nontherapeutic abortions as a condition of purchasing land from the Catholic Church).
87
FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5. While courts are unlikely to uphold a restrictive covenant like this as
running with the land, it might be enforceable against the buyer and/or for a reasonable period of time
against future buyers.
88
Leo P. Brideau et al., Examples of For-Profit Health Care Models, in IS A FOR-PROFIT STRUCTURE
A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE MINISTRY? 27, 31 (Kathleen M. Boozang ed.,
2012),
https://law.shu.edu/Health-Law/upload/Catholic-Health-Care-Symposium-Proceedings.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZU8S-YUCK].
89
Id. at 29–31.
90
Id. at 31.
91
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-24, NOT-FOR-PROFIT HOSPITALS:
CONVERSION ISSUES PROMPT INCREASED STATE OVERSIGHT 22 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/assets/
230/225067.pdf [https://perma.cc/QXC4-TSBT] (stating that, in most states, the attorney general has
authority to review nonprofit conversions and, where appropriate, to enforce state requirements that
protect charitable benefits).
92
Judith VandeWater, Tenet Sells 2 St. Louis-Area Community Hospitals, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2004.
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tubal ligations and fertility treatments after its merger with Catholic St.
Mary’s Health System.93 The subsequent for-profit, secular buyer—Health
Management Associates—agreed to continue religious indicia and to
prohibit abortion and euthanasia across the formerly Baptist and Catholic
hospitals, now operated under the name Tennova.94 And more than a year
and a half after Health Management Associates’ sale to Community Health
Systems, the nation’s largest for-profit system, Tennova’s website continued
to describe it as a “faith-based healthcare system.”95 Religious compliance
continued as hospitals changed ownership.
Zombie religious hospitals, lacking traditional markers of religious
identity or values, may be created not only through affiliation but also
through disaffiliation. For example, following a dispute over an abortion at
St. Joseph’s hospital in Phoenix, the bishop of the Phoenix diocese revoked
the hospital’s Catholic status.96 The Sisters of Mercy, the women religious
who founded and sponsored the hospital, however, announced that “they will
continue their ministry in the hospital.”97 The hospital did not change its
ownership, name, mission, or “operations, policies, and procedures” and
committed to “continue through our words and deeds to carry out the healing
ministry of Jesus.”98 St. Joseph’s parent company, Catholic Healthcare West,
93
Carly Harrington, Baptist Health System Ceases Tubal Ligations, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL
(Jan. 25, 2008), http://archive.knoxnews.com/business/baptist-health-system-ceases-tubal-ligations-ep412178388-360019551.html [https://perma.cc/68X7-EQQB].
94
Stephanie Bouchard, HMA Aims to Acquire Seven Hospitals, HEALTHCARE FIN. NEWS (May 3,
2011),
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/hma-aims-acquire-seven-hospitals
[https://
perma.cc/AQT4-LUAK] (“Many of the hospitals’ current traditions and values will remain unchanged,
including its ban on direct abortion and euthanasia services.”).
95
East Tennessee’s Tennova Hospitals May Change Hands Again, KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL
(Aug. 05, 2013), http://archive.knoxnews.com/business/east-tennessees-tennova-hospitals-may-changehands-again-ep-510602780-355599891.html [https://perma.cc/TRV6-DN62]; see also Shelley DuBois,
Community Health Systems Completes Purchase of HMA, TENNESSEAN (Jan. 26, 2014, 11:00 PM),
http://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2014/01/27/community-health-systems-completes-purchase-ofhma/4935729 [https://perma.cc/P7UN-GF5B]; About Tennova Healthcare, TENNOVA HEALTHCARE
(2015),
https://web.archive.org/web/20150710012339/http://www.tennova.com
[https://perma.cc/4CWZ-SAW7].
96
Dan Harris, Bishop Strips Hospital of Catholic Status After Abortion, ABC NEWS (Dec. 22, 2010),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/abortion-debate-hospital-stripped-catholic-status/story?
id=12455295. See generally Gerald D. Coleman S. S., Direct and Indirect Abortion in the Roman
Catholic Tradition: A Review of the Phoenix Case, 25 HEC F. 127 (2013) (discussing the conflict).
97
Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Bishop Olmsted Announcement: Frequently Asked
Questions 2 (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.dignityhealth.org/cm/Media/documents/Bishop-OlmstedAnnouncement-Frequently-Asked-Questions-1-7-11stellent/groups/public/@xinternet_con_sys/
documents/webcontent/212448.pdf [https://perma.cc/DG7Y-B4E5].
98
Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., St. Joseph’s Resolved in Saving Mother’s Life,
Confident Following Bishop’s Announcement 1 (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.dignityhealth.org/cm/
Media/documents/St-Josephs-Resolved-in-Saving-Mothers-Life-12-21-10stellent/groups/public/
@xinternet_con_sys/documents.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC2W-TE92].
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subsequently restructured its governance to become Dignity Health, a
nonprofit “rooted in the Catholic tradition, but . . . not an official ministry of
the Catholic Church.”99
In sum, institutions operating under Catholic doctrine fall along a
spectrum. The first-order institutions—those officially designated Catholic
hospitals—have a sponsoring religious order, are nonprofit, and are
recognizable as religious (due to their names or symbols). They lack,
however, the many attributes that they once had, such as a community of
Catholic administrators, owners, and workers, funding through charitable
donations, service to the poor, and close ties to religious orders. Further
along the spectrum, the second-order affiliates involve no Catholic
ownership interest and are outwardly non-Catholic yet assume Catholic
restrictions through contract. At the far end of the spectrum are the thirdorder zombie religious institutions—hospitals that have no ongoing
relationship to a church or union of religious people but nevertheless express
Catholic identity. Almost uniformly, they do so to meet their contractual
obligations. But increasingly they may seek the opportunity to self-designate
as religious even in the absence of contract.
*

*

*

The contracting of religion creates two distinct problems, which the
next two Parts explore. First, contracting religious identity may entitle or
require second- and third-order institutions to claim exemptions from
otherwise applicable laws. The interplay between vague exemption language
and clear contractual obligation may impede public policy goals as the pool
of exempted institutions grows. Second, the ever-expanding category of
“religious institution” destabilizes theories of religious institutionalism that
rest on the specialness of religious institutions and argue for their near-total
autonomy from state regulation.
II. UNDERMINING PUBLIC POLICY
Religious contract provisions not only operate as private agreements
but also affect public law. Unlike other contract terms, they potentially allow
institutions to claim religious exemption from otherwise applicable laws.
Section II.A explores the interplay between contract provisions on the one
hand and statutory and judicial exemptions on the other. It shows that
99
Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., Catholic Healthcare West Is Now Dignity Health 1 (Jan.
23, 2012), http://www.dignityhealth.org/-/media/cm/media/documents/Press%20Releases/2012-01-23Catholic-Healthcare-West-is-Now-Dignity-Health.ashx [https://perma.cc/7APG-EWQH].
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partners, affiliates, and formerly religious hospitals may acquire legal status
as religious for the purpose of exemption from employment
antidiscrimination laws, medical conscience legislation, and employee
benefit protections, among others. They similarly may be able to demand
judicial accommodation under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)100 and perhaps the Constitution. Section II.B explains how
regulatory arbitrage becomes increasingly plausible as religious exemptions
gain financial value and competitors become exempt. Section II.C contends
that as the number of exempt institutions grows, exemption may become the
rule, and the assumptions under which institutional exemptions were granted
may no longer hold.
A. Interplay Between Contract and Exemption
While religious accommodation of individuals is grounded in
individual conscience or faith, exemptions of institutions tend to be justified
as preserving shared faith or church mission.101 But, in commerce, contracts
instead potentially create eligibility for religious exemption. They also may
authorize a diverse array of entities to seek religious exemption under state
and federal religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs) and the
Constitution.102 This relationship between contract and exemption matters
because contracts for religious adherence often promote not corporate social
responsibility—which presumes surpassing regulatory minimums—but
below normal levels of regulatory compliance.

1. Exemptions for Religious Institutions
Religious institutions most commonly enjoy exemptions in their roles
as employers. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and state
antidiscrimination laws authorize religious organizations to discriminate in
favor of employees who share their religion.103 Religious entities may also
100

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2012).
See, e.g., Steven H. Miles et al., Conflicts Between Patients’ Wishes to Forgo Treatment and the
Policies of Health Care Facilities, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 48, 50 (1989) (arguing that as society
recognizes patients’ rights to forego life-sustaining treatment, it must also preserve the “distinct moral
communities” embodied by healthcare facilities and reflected in their mission statements).
102
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). As of May 2017, twenty-one states had enacted state RFRAs with
similar language to the federal RFRA. See Jonathan Griffin, State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (May 4, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-andcriminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/AF96-VLMM].
103
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (stating that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not apply “to
a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation,
association, educational institution, or society of its activities”); IDAHO CODE § 67-5910(2)(c) (2016)
(providing that it is not a discriminatory practice for a religious educational institution or an educational
organization to limit employment or give preference to members of the same religion); see also Kennedy
101
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avoid employee benefits regulation. The Employee Retirement Investment
Security Act (ERISA), for example, exempts “church plans” providing
pension, retirement, and welfare benefits from minimum funding, notice, and
other statutory requirements meant to protect employees’ interests.104
Occasionally, religious entities receive special treatment with regard to
duties toward the public or consumers. The Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), for example, prohibits public accommodations from discriminating
against people with disabilities but contains a religious exemption.105 State
conscience legislation also may permit healthcare institutions to refuse to
perform certain procedures, most frequently abortion, end-of-life care, and
sterilization.106 While healthcare providers have no legal obligation to offer
any particular service, such laws may exempt them from legal duties to treat
a patient in accordance with acceptable standards of medical practice, to
inform her of treatments and their risks and benefits, to refer her for services
they are not able to provide, and not to abandon her.107 They may also lift
statutory duties to stabilize or treat patients suffering from emergency
conditions,108 to ensure rape survivors access to emergency contraception,109
to offer counseling to terminally ill patients about palliative care,110 and to
honor advance directives.111

v. St. Joseph’s Ministries, Inc., 657 F.3d 189, 196 (4th Cir. 2011) (dismissing under Title VII exemption
claims of religious harassment, retaliation, and wrongful discharge brought by a member of the Church
of the Brethren who was a geriatric nursing assistant in Catholic nursing facility); Saeemodarae v. Mercy
Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1040 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (barring a practicing Wiccan’s Title VII
claims of religious discrimination against Catholic hospital); Farnam v. Crista Ministries, 807 P.2d 830,
840 (Wash. 1991) (holding, under state employment discrimination law, that the mission and holding out
of an exempt religious umbrella organization extended the exemption to its subdivisions, in that case a
nursing home).
104
29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(2) (2012).
105
42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012).
106
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-304(5) (2016); IDAHO CODE § 18-611(2) (2016); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 41-107-7 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. § 197.032 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-111 (2015).
107
61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, & OTHER HEALERS § 121 (2017); see also Maxine M.
Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: The Quest for Immunity in the Struggle
Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 804, 822–23 (2007).
108
See, e.g., 210 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 (2016). State laws, however, cannot exempt hospitals
from the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
109
CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.11(e) (Deering 2016); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/2.2 (2016); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 24-10D-3 (2016); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-p (McKinney 2016); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.29 (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1350(B) (2016); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 70.41.350(1)(c) (2016); see also State Policies on Contraception, GUTTMACHER INST.,
https://www.guttmacher.org/united-states/contraception/state-policies-contraception [https://perma.cc/
C6JV-DCFF].
110
See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2997-c (McKinney 2016).
111
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.633(3) (LexisNexis 2016).
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Religious institutions also may request judicial accommodation from
legal mandates under the Constitution and through operation of statute. The
First Amendment of the Constitution allows religious institutions to demand
a ministerial exception from laws regulating their relationships with
employees deemed “ministers.”112 More broadly, federal and state RFRAs
protect against governmental imposition of a substantial burden on religion
unless it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2)
is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”113

2. Determining Entitlement to Religious Exemptions
While some statutes circumscribe the institutions entitled to exemption,
most contain no definition of religious institution or organization.114 The
ADA exempts “religious organizations or entities controlled by religious
organizations.”115 The statute, however, does not define the terms, and the
ADA’s implementing regulations take the perspective that the exemption “is
very broad, encompassing a wide variety of situations.”116 Title VII, for
example, says “religious corporation, association, educational institution, or
society,” without more.117 Courts agree on the fact that this language extends
beyond houses of worship but on little else.118

112
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012).
Some courts apply the ministerial exception more broadly to encompass claims based on contract. See,
e.g., DeBruin v. St. Patrick Congregation, 816 N.W.2d 878, 889 (Wis. 2012).
113
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). The federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (RLUIPA) further permits “a religious assembly or institution” an exemption from a land use
regulation that imposes a substantial burden on its religious exercise unless the regulation is in the
“furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and is the “least restrictive means of furthering” that
interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
114
For scholarly examination of statutory definitions of religious institutions, see generally Bruce N.
Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious
Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979), proposing evaluating a religious organization’s activities
along a spectrum from a spiritual core to the secular, and Michael A. Helfand, What Is a “Church”?:
Implied Consent and the Contraception Mandate, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 401 (2013), arguing
that religious institutions should be exempted from legal mandates under the theory of implied consent.
115
42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012).
116
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C, § 36.104 (2017); see also Rose v. Cahee, 727 F. Supp. 2d 728, 748 (E.D.
Wis. 2010) (interpreting the ADA’s religious organization exemption to protect an officially designated
Catholic healthcare system).
117
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012).
118
For a sense of the variety of tests in use, see LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n,
503 F.3d 217, 226 (3d Cir. 2007), balancing nine different factors; Hall v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care
Corp., 215 F.3d 618, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2000), also balancing nine different factors; Killinger v. Samford
Univ., 113 F.3d 196, 198 (11th Cir. 1997), “sufficiently ‘sectarian’”; EEOC v. Kamehameha Sch./Bishop
Estate, 990 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1993), “primarily religious”; and Fike v. United Methodist Children’s
Home of Va., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 286, 289–90 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983).
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The ambiguous and broad language of institutional exemptions often
leads courts to use a number of contradictory factors to identify a religious
institution. Across contexts, an official link to an established church proves
relevant.119 Courts may look to control by a religious institution through
board representation or involvement in management.120 Less often, courts
take an associational view of the institution, requiring a religious entity to
serve and employ coreligionists. Alternatively, mission-oriented
characteristics can indicate religious status. Courts examine the corporate
structure, bylaws, articles of incorporation, or other corporate documents for
religious references.121 They may look to whether an entity held itself out as
religious such that “the religious character of the institution was open and
obvious” to employees or the public.122 Finally, the profit- or revenueseeking nature of an enterprise can indicate secular pursuits. Statutes may
expressly limit the scope of institutional accommodation to nonprofit
entities.123 And, sometimes, where statutes are silent, courts have identified
nonprofit status as a marker (or, indeed, the marker) of religiosity.124 While
statutes vary, courts typically apply some mix of these factors, emphasizing
and deemphasizing particular ones.
119

Some statutory language so requires. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2012) (defining an
organization eligible to participate in church plans exempted from ERISA as one “associated with a
church or a convention or association of churches” where the organization “shares common religious
bonds and convictions with that church or convention or association of churches”).
120
LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 226 (suggesting as a factor for determining religious exemption under Title
VII “whether a formally religious entity participates in the management, for instance by having
representatives on the board of trustees”).
121
See, e.g., Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 310 (4th Cir. 2004)
(holding that a nursing home is a “religious institution” for purposes of ministerial exception so as to
exempt from Fair Labor Standards Act whenever its “mission is marked by clear or obvious religious
characteristics”); see also Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 734 (9th Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain,
J., concurring) (setting out a test consisting of (1) nonprofit status, (2) a self-identified religious purpose,
(3) activity consistent with and in furtherance of those purposes, and (4) holding oneself out as religious);
Saeemodarae v. Mercy Health Servs., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (N.D. Iowa 2006) (barring a Wiccan
employee’s religious discrimination claim against Catholic hospital).
122
Michael A. Helfand, Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as Arbitration, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1891, 1936 (2013). Helfand notes that “the court in Shaliehsabou also emphasized various ways in
which the defendant conducted business such that it would be obvious to an employee that the institution
was religious.” Id.
123
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363A.26 (2013) (exempting “religious association, religious corporation,
or religious society that is not organized for private profit” from “taking any action with respect to the
provision of goods, services, facilities, or accommodations directly related to the solemnization or
celebration of a civil marriage that is in violation of its religious beliefs”).
124
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“The fact that an operation is not
organized as a profit-making commercial enterprise makes colorable a claim that it is not purely secular
in orientation.”); see also World Vision, 633 F.3d at 734 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (“[A]n
organization’s status as a nonprofit bolsters a claim that its purpose is nonpecuniary.”).
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With regard to RFRA and the First Amendment ministerial exception,
judicial tests—though ill-defined—also seem to employ multiple factors to
discern religious belief in institutional form. For example, in interpreting
“person” capable of exercising religion under RFRA to include for-profit
corporations, the Supreme Court, in its Hobby Lobby decision, dismissed the
idea that religious affiliation or incorporation as religious is a prerequisite
for religiosity.125 Instead, it highlighted the associational interests preserved
through institutional religious identity. As the Court saw it, a for-profit
corporation unites individuals in their devotion to religious tenets, just as a
religious organization might.126 The Court, however, also seemed to accept a
view of religious identity focused on the entity and thus noted that corporate
documents could manifest religion.127
In elaborating on the constitutional ministerial exception in HosannaTabor, the Court was similarly imprecise. It used the terms “church,”
“religious organization,” “religious group,” and “religious institution”
interchangeably in a case involving a school.128 Indeed, courts have
interpreted the ministerial exception to allow healthcare entities to engage in
discrimination against and undercompensate employees.129 For example, one
court dismissed a racial and religious discrimination claim brought by a
hospital chaplain against New York Methodist Hospital, part of the New
York-Presbyterian Healthcare system.130 The hospital had not been owned by
the Methodist Church for decades, had revised its certificate of incorporation
to remove any relation to the church, affirmatively had stated that it was a
secular organization, and had employed members of various faiths within its
pastoral program. Nonetheless, the court held that the hospital was entitled
to the ministerial exception through its historic relationship to the church,
active pastoral care (admittedly provided by leaders of various faiths, as it is
125

134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769 (2014).
Id. at 2768–69 (noting that the protection of corporate religion safeguards the rights of “the people
(including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or
another”).
127
Id. at 2764–66 (noting that Conestoga Wood’s “Vision and Values Statements” required the
company to “ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the shareholders’] Christian heritage”
and Hobby Lobby’s statement of purpose committed to “operating the company in a manner consistent
with Biblical principles” (first and second alteration in original)).
128
See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 173, 181,
188 (2012).
129
See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (precluding ADA
claims of resident in clinical pastoral education program in hospital); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of
Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309–11 (4th Cir. 2004) (preventing kosher supervisor from proceeding
with Fair Labor Standards Act wage claim against Jewish nursing home); Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal
Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (barring hospital chaplain’s sex and age discrimination
claims).
130
Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 158 F. Supp. 3d 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
126
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in secular hospitals), maintenance of “Methodist” in its name, and significant
required Methodist representation on its board.131 The hospital was “acting
as a religious institution” with regard to the plaintiff—even though it was
“primarily a secular institution.”132
The various affiliates of churches and the rise of parachurch
organizations unconnected to an official church have occasionally
challenged courts and regulators,133 but the increasing combination of
religion and commerce (or even the pursuit of profit) poses more difficult
questions about which institutions count as religious. In particular, what does
it mean for an institution to be religious in a market where commercial
agreements call for religious adherence? A number of courts (and scholars)
include officially designated Catholic hospitals within the realm of religious
institutions for purposes of statutory and constitutional exemptions.134 But
are these “original” first-order religious institutions entitled to
accommodation also authorized to extend exemption to their commercial
counterparts through contract?
Contracted-for religious identity and compliance add complexity that
statutory language and constitutional doctrine are currently ill prepared to
confront. As this Article demonstrated in Part I, facilities may claim
“Catholic” identity even when they further no charitable mission, when they
are repudiated by the Church, or when Catholic entities hold no ownership
stake. The inclusion of public entities and for-profit investment funds in the
universe of enterprises following religious restrictions further confounds.
While one can easily tell where a natural person begins and ends, the
demarcation of the boundaries of an institution presents a thornier problem.
Even in a single statutory framework, factors used to identify a religious
institution point in different directions with regard to contracted-for religion.
Recall the Caritas system in Boston that was sold to for-profit Cerberus.135
131

Id. at 182.
Id. at 183.
133
Thomas M. Messner, Can Parachurch Organizations Hire and Fire on the Basis of Religion
Without Violating Title VII?, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 63, 69–71 (2006) (explaining that the broader
question of which parachurch organizations are “religious” remains latent).
134
Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 831 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (“Courts view the Official
Catholic Directory listing as a public declaration by the Roman Catholic Church that an organization is
associated with the Church.”); see also Catholic Charities of Me., Inc. v. City of Portland, 304 F. Supp.
2d 77, 85–86 (D. Me. 2004) (referring to, inter alia, the Official Catholic Directory as evidence that
Catholic Charities’ health benefit plans qualify for ERISA church plan status); Hartwig v. Albertus
Magnus Coll., 93 F. Supp. 2d 200, 202–03 (D. Conn. 2000) (“[T]he Official Catholic Directory . . . is the
definitive compilation of Roman Catholic institutions in the United States.”). For examples in the
scholarly literature, see supra note 13.
135
See supra notes 74–83 and accompanying text (describing the sale of Caritas Assets to
Cerberus—a private equity fund—and the provisions of the Asset Sale and Purchase Agreement).
132
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The facilities now are for-profit and investor owned, and the Church has no
direct or indirect financial interest in the facilities. If, however, courts
deferred to the Catholic hierarchy, the chain would be considered Catholic
and thus a religious institution. Examination of corporate documents might
lead to a similar result, as Cerberus agreed to continue the chain’s Catholic
identity, Catholic officials exercise oversight of the facilities, and the ERDs
constitute corporate policy.136 Alternatively, courts might find disqualifying
the absence of Church hierarchy from the board of directors and its ultimate
lack of control over corporate assets.137 Courts considering the outward signs
of the religious character of the institution might be swayed by Cerberus’s
contractual agreement to maintain pastoral care, chaplaincy, and religious
symbols.138 If, as some argue, “an organization that affiliates with a religious
group, declares a religious mission, and has some religious qualities will
qualify for the exemption” under Title VII,139 many formerly religious and
nominally secular hospitals will be allowed to engage in religious
discrimination.
Courts might reach contradictory results depending on their form of
inquiry. If ownership is determinative, Baptist ownership of 50% of Cullman
Regional Medical Center (in a public-private partnership) might make that
facility more religious than the for-profit hospital formed in an 80–20 joint
venture between for-profit secular Oak Hill Capital and Catholic Ascension
Health.140 If the obviousness of religious identity matters, now-secular West
Suburban hospital might be disqualified from claiming it is a religious
institution because of its lack of religious symbols or message despite having
assumed obligations to abide by Catholic directives.141 By contrast,
otherwise-identical Tennova health system—a once-Baptist/Catholic
system—could continue to claim its stated identity as a “faith-based
organization” and likely any exemptions for which it was previously
eligible.142

136
See generally Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79 (contracting for the
continuation of Catholic healthcare standards after the sale to a for-profit entity).
137
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991) (finding
that a religious hospital qualified as a religious institution for the purposes of the ministerial exception in
part because of the composition of the board of directors and that the articles of association could only be
amended by approval of church hierarchy).
138
Caritas Christi Stewardship Agreement, supra note 79, at 4–5.
139
Roger W. Dyer, Jr., Note, Qualifying for the Title VII Religious Organization Exemption: Federal
Circuits Split over Proper Test, 76 MO. L. REV. 545, 556–57 (2011).
140
See Romano, supra note 54; supra note 88.
141
See Stempniak, supra note 1 (noting that religious artifacts will be removed but the hospitals will
follow Catholic healthcare directives).
142
See supra note 95.
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Mixed-religion institutions further complicate analysis. For example,
Baptist hospitals have affiliated with Catholic facilities, agreeing to comply
with Catholic doctrine but receiving assurances that the Baptist faith and
identity will continue.143 In the case of a nontherapeutic abortion where the
Catholic and Baptist teachings align, the Baptist hospital could assert its
Baptist faith. It seems plausible, however, that if it later denies a tubal
ligation to comply with the Catholic directives, it would raise Catholic faith
as qualifying it for exemption in states that allow for religious refusals.
B. Potential for Regulatory Arbitrage
In healthcare, contract and exemption tend to operate together, with
institutions acquiring religious identity through connection to “original”
first-order religious institutions. Hospital owners generally have not
strategically denominated facilities as religious. Nonetheless, some
healthcare systems now unite Catholic, non-Catholic, and secular facilities,
and take religious exemptions when expedient. And Dignity Health,
discussed in Part I, disaffiliated with the Church but continues to claim
Catholic identity.144
Where corporate identity is easy to acquire and religious exemptions
are financially valuable, regulatory arbitrage may become a more common
practice. Commercial actors whose competitors enjoy religious exemption
through contract may come to self-designate as religious. In that case, the
concern shifts from the scope of contractual obligation squarely to the
breadth of exemption.
Some judicial tests for the identification of religious institutions leave
the door open for corporations to self-designate as religious and therefore
entitled to exemption. For example, in Spencer v. World Vision, Judge
Diarmuid O’Scannlain indicated that, provided a corporation was nonprofit,
its identification of a religious identity and purpose sufficed to bring it within
the scope of Title VII’s institutional exemption.145 Thus, the entity’s ability
to claim religious exemption lay primarily within its control. Concurring in
the result, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld disagreed on this point, signaling alarm
about potential gaming of the religious exemption. Focusing on corporate
documents allowed, he said, “nonprofit institutions with church affiliations
to use their affiliations as a cover for religious discrimination in secular
143
See Wood, supra note 51 (describing affiliation of Baptist and Catholic hospitals that committed
to preserving the religious values of both faiths).
144
See Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., supra note 99 (stating that the new name of the
hospital reflects the reality that the hospital, though rooted in Catholic principles, is not officially
connected to the Catholic Church).
145
619 F.3d 1109, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010) (setting out this proposed test).
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employment” and “people to advance discriminatory objectives outside the
context of religious exercise by means of mere corporate paperwork.”146
Following the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision, for-profit
corporations may be able to self-designate as religious for purposes of RFRA
as well. The decision seemingly allows a corporation to establish religious
identity through corporate documents,147 even those prepared in anticipation
of litigation.148 Any such company then can become eligible to claim
exemption from federal law under RFRA.
Where economic interest aligns with religious exemption, commercial
operations may claim religious status opportunistically. As Judge Mary Beck
Briscoe noted in her dissent from the Tenth Circuit’s Hobby Lobby opinion,
[I]f all it takes for a corporation to be categorized as a “faith based business”
for purposes of RFRA is a combination of a general religious statement in the
corporation’s statement of purpose and more specific religious beliefs on the
part of the corporation’s founders or owners, the majority’s holding will have,
intentionally or unwittingly, opened the floodgates to RFRA litigation
challenging any number of federal statutes that govern corporate affairs.149

Whereas the grant of an exemption for the religious use of peyote, for
example, is “self-limiting” by virtue of the drug’s unpleasantness,150
exemption from employer regulation has no such limits. Given the breadth
of Title VII’s language regarding religious organizations, another court
worried that it too could come to “immunize[] virtually every endeavor
undertaken by a religious organization,” even including “a trucking firm, a
chain of motels, a race track, a telephone company, a railroad, a fried chicken
franchise, or a professional football team.”151 A wide pool of claimants might

146

Id. at 1130 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring); id. at 1127; see also id. at 1147 (Berzon, J., dissenting)
(expressing concern that rejecting the inquiry into the link between commercial activity and self-identified
religious purpose means “disregard[ing] the fact that the manufacture of equipment remains the
organization’s primary operational pursuit and that there is nothing more than the asserted religious
beliefs of the organization’s founders to connect that secular activity to the stated religious purpose”).
147
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014) (looking to corporate
documents of for-profit Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood).
148
See, e.g., Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 917 F. Supp. 2d 394, 403 (E.D. Pa.
2013) (noting that more than a year after the contraceptive regulation was issued but before its plan
became subject to the mandate, “the board of directors adopted ‘The Hahn Family Statement on the
Sanctity of Human Life’”).
149
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1174 (10th Cir. 2013) (Briscoe, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), aff’d sub nom. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751 (2014).
150
Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 914 n.7 (1990) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“The peyote plant is extremely bitter, and eating it is an unpleasant experience, which would
tend to discourage casual or recreational use.”).
151
King’s Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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emerge in the event that, as some claim, a significant and increasing trend
exists toward bringing religion into corporate governance.152
The expanding use of ERISA’s church plan exemption makes manifest
the potential appeal to commercial actors of religious identity and
exemption.153 Church plan status provides great financial value because it
permits employers to underfund pension plans, avoid federal pension
insurance payments, and fail to notify employees of the plan’s status.154 The
exemption in turn can aid the sale of religiously affiliated hospitals to secular
buyers (which then assume no pension obligations) and the purchase of
hospitals by religious systems, which can deregulate the pension plans after
purchase (even if the hospitals remain secular).155
Indeed, healthcare systems and hospitals use church plans selectively.
They label pensions “church plans” to avoid ERISA’s extensive regulation
but categorize health benefits as ERISA plans to benefit from ERISA
preemption of state insurance regulations.156 Other healthcare entities have
converted their employees’ long-standing ERISA pension plans to church
plan status in response to the economic downturn157 or on the advice of
consulting firms.158 Four of the nation’s ten largest multimillion-dollar

152
See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 180–81 (2014)
(arguing that people increasingly integrate business and religion); Robert K. Vischer, How Necessary Is
the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403, 1414–15 (2012) (arguing that “reality of the corporate
landscape” shows a commitment to religious and moral positions).
153
See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(33) (2012) (defining “church plan”). ERISA exempts church plans
providing pension, retirement, and welfare benefits from minimum funding, notice, and other statutory
requirements that would otherwise protect employees. Id.
154
Norman Stein, AM. BAR. ASS’N SECTION OF LABOR & EMP’T LAW, An Article of Faith: The
Gratuity Theory of Pensions and Faux Church Plans, EMP. BENEFITS COMM. NEWSLETTER (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/ebc_newsletter/14_sum_ebc_news/fai
th.html [https://perma.cc/5NLH-THEJ] (noting the consequences of receiving church plan status from the
IRS).
155
Karin Price Mueller, Bamboozled: How Catholic Hospitals Get Away with Letting Pensions Go
Broke, NJ.COM (published Nov. 28, 2016, 9:09 AM; updated Nov. 28, 2016, 9:40 AM),
http://www.nj.com/business/index.ssf/2016/11/bamboozled_how_catholic_hospitals_get_away_with_le
.html [https://perma.cc/3279-CDKX] (discussing conversions of Catholic hospital employee pension
plans to underfunded church plans and subsequent sales of hospitals to nonprofit and for-profit buyers
that thus assumed no funding obligations).
156
See, e.g., Complaint – Class Action at 41–45, Griffith v. Providence Health & Servs., No. 2:14cv-01720 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2014), ECF No. 1 (noting that Providence, a large healthcare system with
73,000 employees, claims its pension plan is an exempt church plan but follows ERISA for its welfare
benefit plan).
157
See, e.g., Kaplan v. St. Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at
*2 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014) (noting that SPHS filed its application for church plan status during the
nationwide economic downturn in 2006).
158
See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh, I.R.S. Reversal on ‘Church’ Pension Plan Rescues a Fund, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/business/an-irs-reversal-rescues-a-pension-
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healthcare systems in 2017 operated their pension plans as church plans.159
In this way, they avoided regulations to which their secular competitors are
subject.
C. Exception Swallowing the Rule
In crafting religious accommodations, legislatures and courts take as a
fundamental premise that accommodation does not defeat the purpose of the
law. As Professor Perry Dane describes them, free exercise exemptions are
“more an island in a world of legal obligation than an overarching challenge
to the notion of such obligation.”160 Religious objectors will not become so
numerous or so powerful as to thwart the achievement of policy goals or
threaten the rights of other citizens. This prediction of relatively small
numbers of objectors relies—in part—on the impermanence of objectors.
Individuals die, commercial actors fail in the marketplace, and their
exemptions go with them. This Section examines litigation surrounding the
Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive mandate, ERISA church plan
exemption eligibility, and conscience legislation to demonstrate how
contract expands religious exemptions and risks the rule.
Recent litigation against the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive
mandate highlights the role of private law in widening religiosity and
exemption. Hobby Lobby involved a corporation that used private law both
to create and to perpetuate religious identity. Family members involved in
the ownership and direction of the corporation had to agree to religious

fund.html [https://perma.cc/6FXG-ZHAR] (“Tough economic times, and pitches from benefits
consultants, have prompted more than 100 faith-based employers to seek church plan status . . . .”).
159
Laura Dyrda, 10 Largest US Health Systems: Which Had the Biggest Revenue Increase in 2016?,
BECKER’S HOSP. REV. (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/hospital-finance/10largest-us-health-systems-which-had-the-biggest-revenue-increase-in-2016.html
[https://perma.cc/H5B7-6KXV] (showing increase in patient revenues in ten largest health systems); see
also Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1193 (D. Colo. 2015) (same); Overall
v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (same); Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp.
3d 909, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Complaint – Class Action, supra note 156, at 1–2 (noting that the
healthcare employer’s retirement plan was claimed to be a “church plan” under ERISA); Complaint –
Class Action at 1–2, Chavies v. Catholic Health E., No. 2:13-cv-01645-CDJ (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013),
ECF No. 1 (same).
160
Perry Dane, Constitutional Law and Religion, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 119 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 2010), Blackwell Reference Online.
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precepts.161 A trust ensured that, even after the company’s founder and family
patriarch steps down, the corporation will continue on as religious.162
In other litigation against the mandate, contract again was at issue.
Nonprofit religious employers argued that their accommodation from the
contraceptive mandate did not suffice because their religious convictions
forbid them from contracting with companies that must comply with their
own regulatory obligations to provide contraception to the nonprofits’
employees.163 In effect, the employers demanded accommodation for entities
with which they have a contractual relationship.
Contracted-for religious compliance may convert the religious
principles of a minority into the practice of a plurality, or majority, of people.
ERISA’s church plan exemption offers an example where affiliations have
widened the reach of religious exemption. At the core of the church plan
exemption is the institutional church. The statute thus requires an
“association” with a church, focusing on whether an entity shares “common
religious bonds and convictions with that church.”164 Through affiliation,
nonchurch entities—like hospitals and social service providers—have
benefited from deregulation of their employees’ pension plans.165
Religious health systems have brought secular entities under their
umbrella and into the exemption regime. For example, Providence—a
Catholic healthcare system with thirty-four hospitals and more than 73,000
employees—claimed a church plan exemption for its pension plan. Included
in that plan were employees of recently acquired facilities with no religious

161
Verified Complaint at 9, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla.
2012) (No. 5:12-CV-01000-HE), 2012 WL 4009450 (noting that all family members “must sign a Trust
Commitment, which among other things requires them to affirm the Green family statement of faith and
to ‘regularly seek to maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord Jesus Christ by regularly investing time
in His Word and prayer’”).
162
David Whitford, Hobby Lobby’s Religious Real Estate Hobby, FORTUNE (Oct. 22, 2010, 6:10
AM),
http://archive.fortune.com/2010/10/21/news/companies/hobby_lobby_philanthropy.fortune/
index.htm [https://perma.cc/R2QH-5URC] (“[W]hen Green [the company’s founder] dies, ownership of
Hobby Lobby will pass to a trust, eliminating any possible means or motive on the part of his descendants
to sell, go public, or otherwise interrupt the [religious identity].”).
163
See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014) (summarizing Notre
Dame’s argument that the contraceptive mandate “imposes a substantial burden on it by forcing the
university to ‘identify[ ] and contract[ ] with a third party willing to provide the very services Notre Dame
deems objectionable’” (alterations in original)).
164
29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C)(iv) (2012) (defining an organization eligible to participate in church
plans exempted from ERISA as one “associated with a church or a convention or association of churches”
where the organization “shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention
or association of churches”).
165
Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d, 816, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (noting plaintiff’s arguments
that Ascension lacked common bonds with a church and acted like a secular, revenue-seeking entity, in
particular through its many joint ventures with for-profits).
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identity.166 Having cut ties with the Catholic Church, another health system,
Dignity Health, nonetheless has argued that its employee retirement plan is
a “church plan” not subject to regulation under ERISA.167 For approximately
two decades, the IRS routinely issued letter rulings in favor of church plan
status for such entities.168
The interaction between contract and conscience legislation offers
another example of the exception risking the rule. Conscience laws offer
broad immunity from regulatory enforcement, professional discipline, and
tort liability to clinicians who refuse to provide certain services, such as
abortion care, for religious reasons.169 Contracts requiring refusal of certain
procedures potentially shape the scope of this exemption in two ways. First,
contracts of religious compliance inevitably affect individual religious
exemption. As a rule, conscience legislation requires that individual
providers hold religious, moral, or ethical reasons for refusing care. If a
provider holds no such beliefs but refuses care in compliance with contract,
would he fall within the reach of the exemption? Contractual terms that
require him to withhold care or information from patients seem to constitute
an agreement to commit a tort (unenforceable as a matter of public policy)
but have been used to create compliance in religious institutions for decades.
Second, secular partners of religious entities may acquire immunity
through commercial transaction. In some states, any entity may refuse to
provide abortions for any reason; the institution need not claim a religious
reason for refusal.170 In those states, contracts requiring refusal of services
for religious reasons shift practice in the healthcare marketplace but do not

166

Complaint – Class Action, supra note 156, at 20, 28.
Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 912 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
168
See Stein, supra note 154; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,007 (July 1, 1983), 1983 WL
197946 (construing ERISA’s requirement that a church plan be established and maintained by a church
to allow a plan to qualify as a “church plan” where it is maintained by an entity “associated” with a
church).
169
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C) (2017) (“A health care provider is not subject to
criminal or civil liability or professional discipline for . . . [f]ailing to comply with a decision or a
direction [at the end of life] that violates the provider’s conscience . . . .”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-3
(West 2016) (“The refusal to perform, assist in the performance of, or provide abortion services or
sterilization procedures shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal liability, disciplinary action or
discriminatory treatment.”).
170
Typical statutory language reads: “A hospital is not required to admit any patient for the purpose
of performing an abortion.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(A) (2017). Several also allow refusals of
other procedures without religious or moral reason. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-447 (2012) (“No
medical care facility, medical care facility administrator, or governing board of any medical care facility
shall be required to permit the performance, referral for or participation in medical procedures resulting
in sterilization within its facility . . . .”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-22-410(a)(v) (2007) (immunizing
healthcare institutions that decline to follow an advance directive which “is contrary to . . . the written
policies of the institution”).
167
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alter the category of exempted entity. But in a number of states and with
regard to most procedures other than abortion, statutes expressly apply only
to institutions that refuse care for religious or moral reasons.171 And as Part I
showed, institutions—ranging from formerly Catholic for-profits to secular
partners of Catholic healthcare—refuse services due instead to their
contractual obligations.
Consider Highline Medical Center in Washington State, which
remained secular following its acquisition by Catholic Franciscan but
discontinued religiously restricted reproductive and end-of-life services.172
Under Washington law, healthcare facilities may not be required “to
participate in the provision of . . . [any] specific service if they object to so
doing for reason of conscience or religion.”173 The law makes clear that it is
balancing the accommodation of providers’ objections against a public
policy goal of ensuring patients’ timely access to health services.174 A
contractual commitment to religious compliance should not suffice to
counterbalance patients’ rights to care and to render the institution eligible
for exemption under laws that specify religious or moral objections. Yet the
contracting parties seem to take it to do just that.
Whether the exception swallows the rule may depend in part on the
form the exemption takes: in other words, whether it is granted by statute,
regulation, or the courts. Statutory exemptions may be especially likely to
171
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2154(B) (2017) (allowing refusal of abortion, emergency
contraception, or “any medication or device intended to inhibit or prevent implantation of a fertilized
ovum” based “on moral or religious grounds”); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3213(d) (1988) (with regard to
abortions, a medical facility is not required to act against “its conscience”); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-75
(1975) (specifying that abortion refusal must be based on “personal, ethical, moral or religious grounds”).
In the majority of states, refusal to comply with a directive or instruction at the end of life requires
reasons of conscience. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-6-109(c) (2013) (“A healthcare institution may
decline to comply with an individual instruction or healthcare decision if the instruction or decision . . .
[i]s contrary to a policy of the institution that is based on reasons of conscience . . . .”). For near-identical
language, see ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.060(e) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3205(C)(1) (2014);
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4734 (b) (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2508(e) (1996); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 327E-7(e) (1999); IDAHO CODE § 39-4508 (2012); IND. CODE § 30-5-9-10(2) (1991); ME. STAT. tit. 18A, § 5-807(e) (1995); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 5-613 (LexisNexis 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 201D, § 14 (1990); MO. REV. STAT. § 404.830(1) (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7A-7(E) (2015);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5424(a) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-1808 (2004); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 9713(c)(3) (2018).
172
Ostrom, supra note 43 (quoting Highline CEO Mark Benedum as saying his hospital will remain
secular but align its ethics policies with Franciscan’s). Another example in Washington is Providence
Health’s affiliation with Swedish, which then cut abortions at all five of its hospitals. Carol M. Ostrom,
Swedish Alliance with Providence Is Now Complete, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:32 PM),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/swedish-alliance-with-providence-is-now-complete
[https://perma.cc/BE4E-SZS7].
173
WASH. REV. CODE § 48.43.065(2)(a) (2017).
174
Id. § 48.43.065(1), (2)(b). For a similar framework, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-6-102 (2017).
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grow because institutions can effectively claim them sub silentio. For
example, a hospital may benefit from exemption through a conscience law
without notifying the state. Some laws even seem to contemplate that
contract will create religious identity sufficient for exemption from
otherwise applicable law. For example, Utah’s recent nondiscrimination law
exempts from housing and employment nondiscrimination an affiliate of a
religious organization, defined in part by contract.175 Legislators, however,
may not have appreciated the extent to which religious organizations contract
for religious compliance.
Regulatory exemptions may also apply broadly. Consider, for example,
that the IRS regularly issues church plan exemptions to nonchurch affiliates,
including those that encompass secular entities, and until recently did not
require employers to notify their employees of a change to church plan
status.176 Another example can be found in the contraceptive coverage
regulations issued following Hobby Lobby. Under those regulations, “any
for-profit entity that is controlled directly or indirectly by a nonprofit eligible
organization” could claim a religious accommodation from the contraceptive
mandate.177 This interpretation could mean that for-profit entities created
through a joint venture between a for-profit investor and a religious entity
could claim accommodation (or be required to do so through contract). Any
such for-profit entity could qualify for religious accommodation by virtue of
its mere connection to a religious nonprofit entity.
Seeking exemption under RFRA, by contrast, requires an institution to
more visibly declare its religious beliefs. Some of the new purportedly
religious institutions—such as the investor-owned but Catholic-affiliated
hospitals—may be willing to do just that. Of course, sometimes, having to
identify as religious may function as a market check on exemption.178 At

175
An affiliate is defined as “a person that directly or indirectly through one or more intermediaries
controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with” the religious organization. UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-6a-102 (Lexis 2017). “Control” in turn can be established through “contract” that allows “the
direct or indirect possession of the power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies
of an entity.” Id. § 16-6a-102(10). Contract plays an explicit role in Utah’s housing nondiscrimination
statute, which specifies that it will not apply to housing “owned by, operated by, or under contract with
an affiliate” of a religious organization or “owned by or operated by a person under contract” with a
religious organization. Id. § 57-21-3(2)(b)(ii)-(iv) (Lexis 2015).
176
Stein, supra note 154.
177
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and the Affordable Care
Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,326 (July 14, 2015).
178
Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 735 (9th Cir. 2011) (“While public religious
identification will no doubt attract some . . . to the institution, it will dissuade others. In other words, it
comes at a cost. Such market responses will act as a check on institutions that falsely identify themselves
as religious merely to obtain . . . exemption . . . .” (quoting Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335,
1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).
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other times, however, market incentives may cut in favor of asserting
religious identity and demanding exemption. Given that the public may not
follow litigation closely,179 the calculus may depend on the dollar value of
exemption. Moreover, the cost of identifying as religious is likely to be
fleeting; for example, consumers may refrain from shopping at Hobby Lobby
in the near term but return as its notoriety wanes.
Once accommodated, an institution may remain accommodated.
Corporate religious identity and exemption may live on eternally in zombie
religious institutions, despite the absence of an association of religious
people or discernible religious message. This possibility countermands the
assumption that a small, discrete set of religious objectors exists.
Such a fate seems even more likely with regard to judicial exemptions.
With legislative protections, a corporation might become ineligible to claim
exemption (for instance, if the statute required nonprofit status). Courts, by
contrast, are unlikely to be called upon to revisit a decision granting religious
exemption. Through inertia, judicial accommodation may endure even as the
company changes hands. Nor, under Hobby Lobby, is it evident that a change
in organization or ownership would divest the corporation of its religious
identity. Religious exemption could be perpetual for RFRA purposes.
*

*

*

Proponents of religious institutionalism might welcome the spread of
religion through contract. Some might hold principled positions against the
legal requirements, for example, to offer emergency contraception or to not
discriminate on the basis of religion. They might thus applaud the way in
which contracted-for religion undercuts those policies. However, as the next
Part shows, contracted-for religious compliance belies the values of
pluralism and voluntarism that religious institutions purport to embody.
III. DESTABILIZING RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONALISM
In theory and doctrine, religious institutionalism calls for a sphere of
immunity of religious institutions from state interference. This “freedom of
the church” grants religious institutions special status in the social order to
govern their affairs and to define their own boundaries, as Section III.A
179
Brian M. Murray, The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493, 517 n.172
(2012) (“[C]onsidering such market concerns by organizations would seem to assume that individual
consumers or employees actually pay attention to litigation.”); see also Brandon S. Boulter, Goldilocks
and the Three-Judge Panel: Spencer v. World Vision, Inc. and the Religious Organization Exemption of
Title VII, 2011 BYU L. REV. 33, 44 (“This may allow secular entities to redefine themselves as ‘religious’
and thereby receive undeserved exemption from certain requirements of Title VII . . . .”).
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describes. Proponents of religious institutionalism base their claims to broad
institutional autonomy on values of pluralism and voluntarism. According to
this view, robust institutional protection leads to the flourishing of diverse
institutions, alternative sources of authority, and individual liberty.
Extended into the commercial realm, however, religious
institutionalism loses its theoretical grounding. Autonomy for commercial
actors from generally applicable laws is unlikely to foster pluralism or
nourish individual free exercise. As Section III.B explains, wealthy religious
entities can instead corner the market on religious compliance, driving out
other religious groups and secular options. Section III.C argues that
voluntarism also proves elusive once religious institutionalism spreads into
commerce. Fundamentally, Section III.D contends, as institutions
characterized by disparate goals, membership, and organizational forms
adopt religious identity and seek exemption, they put epistemic pressure on
the category of religious institution. Under such circumstances, the realm of
institutional autonomy may shrink rather than swell. The rise of zombie
religious institutions may require culling back religious exemptions in courts
and legislatures.
A. The Freedom of the Church
Religious institutions have long been understood to advance and
safeguard religious liberty. In traditional liberal theory, their rights of free
exercise are understood in associational terms. Institutions enjoy rights by
virtue of aggregating and advancing the consciences of individuals.180
Churches foster and encourage individual free exercise by congregants who
voluntarily join. Echoing this theory, the Supreme Court has previously
taken the perspective that individual religious freedom flourishes where
church affiliates exercise religion.181
In recent years, however, religious liberty doctrine and theory have
taken a distinctly institutional turn. In its 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, the
Supreme Court decided that religious institutions need not comply with
antidiscrimination law when it comes to employees who are ministers—
recognizing a doctrine known as the “ministerial exception” under the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.182 Carving
out a sphere free from regulation, the Court emphasized institutional freedom

180

See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
182
565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012); see supra note 113.
181
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rather than the associational interests of religious individuals.183 While
Hosanna-Tabor is the high-water mark of religious institutionalism, a
number of the Court’s recent religious liberty cases reflect a focus on
institutional autonomy.184 Legal scholars similarly argue that institutions—
not individuals—lie at the core of the First Amendment.185
By contrast to traditional liberal theory, this new religious
institutionalism claims a near-absolute or presumptive autonomy of religious
institutions from regulation.186 Religious institutionalists claim that religious
entities require exemptions from antidiscrimination laws, insurance
mandates, and hospital regulations under constitutional doctrine and
statutory regimes.187 From this perspective, legislative exemptions of
religious institutions reflect their entitlement to independence in their own
affairs.
Religious institutionalists base their claims to broad institutional
autonomy on values of pluralism and voluntarism.188 In contrast to the
impersonal ties of state authority, religious institutions are thought to form

183
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“By forbidding the ‘establishment of religion’ and guaranteeing
the ‘free exercise thereof,’ the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government—unlike the
English Crown—would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents
the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with
the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”).
184
See, e.g., Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (regarding nonprofit employer challenge to
contraceptive mandate); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (regarding forprofit employer challenge to contraceptive mandate); see also B. Jessie Hill, Kingdom Without End? The
Inevitable Expansion of Religious Sovereignty Claims, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2017)
(arguing that Hosanna-Tabor, Hobby Lobby, and Zubik are “united by a common thread of argument—
namely, that religious institutions, because of their religious identity, are to some extent immune from
regulation by the secular state”).
185
See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 293 (“[A]n appropriately institutional approach to the Religion
Clauses would involve attention to the religious-freedom rights of religious entities.”); Paul Horwitz,
Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79,
109 (2009).
186
See supra note 8 (compiling sources).
187
DeBoer, supra note 33, at 1609 (“[R]eligious hospitals should be sheltered from the destructive
force of taxation, the controlling influence of government, and the backdoor regulation of government.”);
Richard W. Garnett et al., How to Protect Endangered Religious Groups You Admire, CHRISTIANITY
TODAY (Aug. 4, 2015), http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2015/august-web-only/how-to-protectendangered-religious-groups-you-admire.html [https://perma.cc/MJ3G-KC49] (arguing in favor of the
First Amendment Defense Act which would exempt nonprofit organizations receiving federal funding
from requirements of nondiscrimination).
188
Garnett, supra note 6, at 273; Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An
Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, 42 (2013) (observing that
“‘freedom of the church’ . . . is a pluralistic claim”); Horwitz, supra note 185, at 104–09 (arguing that
“sphere sovereignty offers an especially full and persuasive account of religious entities as First
Amendment institutions”).
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through organic, personal connections.189 They foster pluralism, offering a
sphere of authority separate and perhaps coequal to the state.
Religious institutionalists stress that autonomy from state interference
leads to pluralism in two senses. First, they expect diverse perspectives
among people and institutions. The results of religious institutionalism are
“healthy, independent, free, diverse institutions”190 and “a profusion of
organically developed institutions and associations.”191 Even among forprofit corporations, some argue, “moral pluralism” becomes possible
through exemption from state regulation.192 On this view, minimizing
regulation of religious institutions proves socially valuable not only in
reducing conflict, but also in encouraging religious and secular views
separate from the state.193 As Professor Angela Carmella puts it,
“[e]xemptions may be fully consistent with the state’s public order function
and the larger common good, particularly when they allow institutions in
civil society to engage in socially responsible, stabilizing and beneficial
activities.”194 In healthcare in particular, “the institutional autonomy of
religious hospitals” should generate societal benefits in the form of
“divergent organizational identities.”195 To fail to grant religious autonomy
to religious entities, by contrast, allows for a totalizing state and limits
associational diversity.
Religious institutionalism embraces pluralism in a second sense, as
sources of authority independent from the secular political authority, whose
reach then is necessarily limited.196 This view of authority is quite robust on
some perspectives. As Professor Richard Garnett describes it, religious
institutions “exercise within the area of their competence an authority so

189
JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 149 (1996) (“The church is usually viewed as a
kind of unified whole, different from the sum of its parts. The glue that holds it together is not
contractual.”).
190
Garnett, supra note 6, at 293.
191
Horwitz, supra note 185, at 84.
192
Robert K. Vischer, Individual Rights vs. Institutional Identity: The Relational Dimension of
Conscience in Health Care, 9 AVE MARIA L. REV. 67, 68, 73–74 (2010) [hereinafter Vischer, Individual
Rights].
193
See, e.g., Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633, 1677 (“The diversity of religious beliefs . . . presupposes a diversity
of religious communities, each of which is able to structure its own internal life according to its own
unique religious views and perspectives.”).
194
Angela C. Carmella, Responsible Freedom Under the Religion Clauses: Exemptions, Legal
Pluralism, and the Common Good, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 403, 408 (2007).
195
Vischer, Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 78–79.
196
Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 959, 998 (1991)
(discussing question of “why the state should recognize the juridical dignity of other legal orders” and
vice versa).
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effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority.”197 From this
perspective, institutional exemptions—whether judicial or legislative—
promote values of institutional self-definition. They also may serve
antiestablishment values, maintaining a wall of separation between church
and state.198 Civil society becomes populated with religious organizations as
a counterweight to the government.
Religious institutionalism also emphasizes voluntarism. On this view,
freedom for religious institutions furthers the religious exercise of
individuals because it protects their voluntary decisions to enter (or exit)
such communities.199 Without “churches” defined to encompass an array of
nonstate actors, individuals lack meaningful freedom of conscience.200
Religious institutions accordingly mediate between individuals and the

197

Richard W. Garnett, Religious Accommodations and—and Among—Civil Rights: Separation,
Toleration, and Accommodation, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 503–04 (2015) (quoting Mark DeWolfe Howe,
The Supreme Court, 1952 Term¾Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 91 (1953)); see also Thomas Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church–State Separation, and the
Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 176 (2011) (“The civil authority—that is, the
authority of a constitutional government—lacks ‘competence’ to intervene in such questions, not so much
because they lie beyond its technical or intellectual capacity, but because they lie beyond its
jurisdiction.”).
198
For example, Congress exempted church plans from ERISA in part because the examination of a
church’s books might be regarded as “an unjustified invasion of the confidential relationship that is
believed to be appropriate with regard to churches and their religious activities.” S. REP. No. 93-383, at
160 (1973).
199
Angela C. Carmella, After Hobby Lobby: The “Religious For-Profit” and the Limits of the
Autonomy Doctrine, 80 MO. L. REV. 381, 416 (2015) [hereinafter Carmella, After Hobby Lobby]; see
also Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 228 (2014) (“[V]oluntariness
must at least mean that individuals know that they are entering into a religious institution and that they
can exit at will.”).
200
See Angela C. Carmella, Mary Ann Glendon on Religious Liberty: The Social Nature of the
Person and the Public Nature of Religion, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1191, 1211–12 (1998) (stating that
“protecting religious freedom in part through the prohibition on religious establishments ensures that
religious associations are free from governmental control so that religious choice is ‘both possible and
meaningful’”); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) Like the Boy
Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 515, 532 (2007) (arguing that religious freedom for any
individual depends on “a civil-society landscape that is thick with churches (and mediating institutions
and associations of all kinds) and by legal rules that acknowledge and capture their importance”); Vischer,
Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 73 (calling “institutional liberty . . . essential for the long-term
flourishing of conscience”).
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state.201 They ensure the robust protection of individual religious exercise202
and act as bulwarks against an overweening state.203
In classic liberal theory, churches are characterized by free and
voluntary choices of individuals to join together.204 Religious institutionalism
sounds in this republican theory,205 but it differs in that it describes an
institution as “more than the sum of its parts.”206 According to this claim,
religious institutions have intrinsic as well as instrumental value and prove
uniquely able to protect individual conscience through their independent and
autonomous existence.207 Their autonomy proves distinguishable from the
rights of the individuals who constitute the whole. Religious institutions thus
are not just like other associations but play a distinctive role in the social
order.
While they often describe their theory as “freedom of the church,”
proponents of institutional autonomy have always included a broader
category of entities—including charities and, typically, healthcare
providers—within the scope of religious institutional autonomy. HosannaTabor, for example, emphasized the autonomy of a “church” but did so in
the case of a school.208 Courts have held that the ministerial exception applies

201

See, e.g., GARVEY, supra note 189, at 153 (“Religious groups are one of the most important of
those associations that stand intermediate between the individual and the state, and provide a buffer that
is the best protection for personal freedom . . . .”); Horwitz, supra note 185, at 83 (“These institutions
serve as a counterweight to the state, ensuring that it ‘may never become an octopus, which stifles the
whole of life.’” (quoting ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 96 (photo. reprint 1999) (1931)));
see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring) (“[T]he autonomy of religious groups, both here in the United States and abroad, has often
served as a shield against oppressive civil laws.”).
202
Robinson, supra note 199, at 213 (“[R]eligious institutions facilitate religious individuals’
exercise of their First Amendment liberties. In this way, religious institutions act as intermediaries and
hold rights only for the purpose of promoting individual liberties and ensuring the protection of individual
interests.”).
203
See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 295 (“It remains the case, though, that the existence and
independence of religious institutions—self-defining, self-governing, self-directing institutions—are
needed, as John Courtney Murray put it, to ‘check the encroachments of secular power and preserve [the]
immunities’ of our ‘basic human things.’” (alteration in original) (quoting JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY,
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 204 (1960))).
204
See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 28 (James H. Tully ed., Hackett Publ’g
Co., 1983) (1689).
205
But see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 8, at 22–23 (criticizing the use of republican theory
as “misplaced” given republicans’ deep skepticism of hierarchical corporate institutions including
churches).
206
Robinson, supra note 199, at 217.
207
Horwitz, supra note 185, at 121 (“Religious entities are protected as a part of the social landscape
not simply because they are instrumentally valuable, but because they are intrinsically valuable, and a
fundamental part of a legally pluralistic society.”).
208
565 U.S. 171, 190–94 (2012).
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to hospitals, nursing homes, social service providers, and beyond.209 Entities
removed from the core “church” have benefited from judicial deference to
claims of religious identity and entitlement to statutory exemption.210 As
Professor Jessie Hill argues, “advocates of robust sovereignty for religious
institutions are generally not eager to set out clear limits on that sovereignty,
and indeed, most of them have not done so.”211 Instead, the theory holds,
religious institutions have the authority to determine their own boundaries
and to define themselves independent from the state.212
Once religious institutionalism extends into commerce, however,
principles of pluralism, voluntarism, and self-definition founder. As the next
Sections show, contracted-for religion and the zombies it generates impede
diverse organizations and sources of authority, coerce individuals, and
threaten any special status religious entities once had.
B. Religious Market Dominance
The experience of religious institutions in healthcare flies in the face of
pluralism as a justification for religious institutionalism. Contracting religion
can result in hegemony. The most powerful business can use its market
position to propagate its faith to the detriment of institutional pluralism.
Institutions—both religious and secular—can converge toward religious
doctrine through commerce, not conversion. Unlike churches that actively
and authoritatively interpret moral values, these institutions may passively
comply with contract.
Like religious institutionalists, some healthcare scholars have expressed
concerns that state regulation and market forces are totalizing with regard to
religious institutions. Exploring isomorphism in the healthcare industry,
scholars have long noted that for-profit and nonprofit hospitals come to adopt
similar missions and characteristics.213 And ownership changes through

209
See, e.g., Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 227 (6th Cir. 2007) (precluding
ADA claims of resident in clinical pastoral education program in hospital); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew
Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d 299, 309–11 (4th Cir. 2004) (preventing kosher supervisor from
proceeding with Fair Labor Standards Act wage claim against Jewish nursing home); EEOC v. Catholic
Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (barring sex discrimination claim under Title VII);
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (barring hospital
chaplain’s sex and age discrimination claims).
210
See infra notes 281–84 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA church plan exemptions).
211
Hill, supra note 184, at 1195.
212
See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 6, at 295 (describing religious institutions as “self-defining, selfgoverning, self-directing institutions”).
213
White, supra note 41, at 214 (“According to many observers, this metamorphosis of the Catholic
health care tradition has yielded organizations that more closely resemble other nonprofit and/or for-profit
health care providers.”).

969

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

mergers and acquisitions can drive such convergence.214 The scholarly
literature frequently notes that religious nonprofits might lose their special
nature as they become like secular for-profits.215 Professor Kathleen
Boozang, for example, has argued that cost control mechanisms,
competition, regulation, and affiliation pressures “threaten[ed] to diminish,
if not completely erode, the ability of sectarian hospitals and nursing homes
to maintain control over the kinds of medical care that they provide.”216
Convergence, scholars have assumed, runs only in one direction.
But, as Part I suggested, Catholic healthcare has enjoyed considerable
financial success in a consolidating market. Between 2001 and 2016, as the
number of acute care hospitals dropped by 6%, the number of Catholicowned or -affiliated acute care hospitals increased by 22%.217 In buying and
selling, Catholic healthcare systems have populated the market with secular
healthcare entities subject to Catholic restrictions.
For other religious healthcare providers, affiliations with Catholic
healthcare frequently prove totalizing, even when they initially purport not
to be. For example, in 2005, in what was heralded as “a rare union of Catholic
and Jewish healthcare providers,” Caritas Health Services and Jewish
Hospital HealthCare Services formed a joint venture whose terms, drafted
by a Jewish rabbi and a Catholic theologian, purported to maintain the
religious traditions of each.218 The Catholic hospitals would remain Catholic
and subject to the ERDs, and the Jewish hospitals would retain their religious
values.219 Subsequently, the new entity merged again, forming KentuckyOne
Health, which agreed to continue the facilities’ respective religious identities
in a way that “honors the rich Jewish and Catholic heritages of its two
sponsors.”220 Immediately, however, the Jewish facilities and the many
affiliated physician groups (including some of Louisville’s largest obstetrics
and gynecology (OB–GYN) practices) received a memo that, on “Day One”
214
Guy David, The Convergence Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Hospitals in the United States,
9 INT’L J. HEALTH CARE FIN. & ECON. 403, 422 (2009).
215
White, supra note 41, at 231 (“If Catholic health care is to survive the uncertainty and radical
changes that are occurring in the architecture of health care delivery, more resources must be invested in
the services they deliver in order to clarify the ways in which they are distinctive.”).
216
Boozang, supra note 37, at 1430–31.
217
UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra note 16, at 3; see also Nina Martin, The Growth of Catholic Hospitals,
By the Numbers, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 18, 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-growthof-catholic-hospitals-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/NA7X-SXZP] (noting that since 2011, the largest
Catholic hospital networks have grown at least another 30%).
218
Melanie Evans, Catholic Jewish Deal in Ky., MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 10, 2005, at 14, 14.
219
Id.
220
JHSMH
&
SJHS
Merge,
KENTUCKYONE
HEALTH
(Jan.
6,
2012),
http://www.kentuckyonehealth.org/body.cfm?id=18&action=detail&ref=174 [https://perma.cc/U6GLBYH5].
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of the merger, they must cease providing contraception, tubal ligations,
vasectomies, and techniques commonly used for abortion and miscarriage
management, unless permissible under Catholic doctrine.221
Like other religious perspectives, secular options may be excluded from
the market. In Lane County, Oregon, for example, the Catholic health system
holds 70% of the hospital market and has affiliations with a large but
unknown percentage of physician groups that restrict care in accordance with
doctrine.222 In Bartlesville, Oklahoma, when Ascension acquired the one
hospital in the city, it required its affiliated physicians (all but one OB–GYN)
to cease prescribing contraceptives—a policy it walked back substantially
after public outcry.223
Negotiated agreements for religiously restricted care may have had a
significant but unappreciated effect on access to healthcare—reproductive
and end-of-life care in particular. Granted, exemption of officially
designated Catholic hospitals already decreases access to care. But the
perpetuity of restrictions and their application to nonobjecting partner
institutions suggest that access to contested care (abortion in particular) may
be more severely limited than previously thought. Indeed, a recent empirical
study found that when a secular hospital affiliates with a Catholic entity
(whether it remains secular or not), the provision of reproductive healthcare
is significantly affected.224 Looking at inpatient discharge data in six highpopulation states, researchers found that Catholic affiliation reduced tubal
ligations by 31%.225 If we only look at Catholic institutions—though they are
many—we may dramatically undercount the reach of religious restrictions.
Admittedly, for some religious institutionalists, the ideal is a dominant
Church. But they predict a Church that dominates by virtue of conviction or
at least tradition.226 With regard to secular affiliates and zombie religious
221

Memorandum to Clinical Operations (ED, OR, Nursing, Pharmacy) Employees, Managers,
Jewish Hosp. & St. Mary’s HealthCare, Saint Joseph Health System, & Univ. of Louisville Hosp., Day
One of Kentucky Newco – Fact Sheet (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.khpi.org/dwnlds/2012/day-onenewco.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKH7-GCG5]; Laura Ungar, Louisville Medical Practice Leaves
KentuckyOne Health over Medical Restrictions on Birth Control, COURIER-JOURNAL (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://resources.nortonhighlands.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/
Louisville_medical_practice_leaves_KentuckyOne_Health_over_me.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VA5X72M].
222
Ikemoto, supra note 72, at 1102 n.84.
223
St. John Responds to Outcry, EXAMINER-ENTERPRISE (Apr. 1, 2014, 9:21 AM), http://examinerenterprise.com/news/local-news/st-john-responds-outcry [https://perma.cc/QG4G-2CEM].
224
Hill et al., supra note 70, at 6–7 (broadly defining a hospital as Catholic if the hospital itself is
designated Catholic, its ownership is Catholic, or the hospital’s system is Catholic).
225
Id. at 13.
226
Vischer, Individual Rights, supra note 192, at 74 (“[T]he moral marketplace enlists actors in an
ongoing conversation—and in a real sense, competition—regarding the good.”).

971

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

institutions, the religious entity does not persuade. Compliance results from
the institution’s economic strength.
Contracting for religion also challenges the second sense of pluralism
urged by religious institutionalism—that is, of juridical authority separate
from the state. Affiliates of Catholic healthcare and zombie Catholic
hospitals do not represent the exercise of autonomous lawmaking that
religious institutionalism celebrates. They simply follow rules in order to
avoid breach of contract. Compliance with contract terms offers little ability
to evolve and to interpret and apply religious authority in context. While
officially designated, traditional Catholic hospitals have experts to answer
ethical dilemmas or advocate for enhanced charitable care, affiliates and
zombie hospitals adhere to contract in a formalistic way.
Indeed, the authority of established religious churches may even be
undermined by zombie hospitals in ways that religious institutionalists
would find troubling. Dignity Health, for example, denominates itself as
Catholic even though the institutional Church disagrees.227 Its St. Joseph
hospital in Phoenix asserts Catholic identity despite revocation of Catholic
status by the local bishop.228
In sum, the dominance of Catholic doctrine manifests not success in
convincing people of its vision of the good life, but financial inducement to
religious adherence. The result is a religiously homogenous market in which
the flourishing of diverse alternative sources of authority goes unrealized.
C. Involuntary Associations
Contract, of course, can be a way of recognizing and affirming common
beliefs and shared commitments. Scholars regularly point to contract as a
mark of voluntarism in relationships between commercial religious entities
and employees.229 Sometimes, they further argue that commercial firms
function like traditional voluntary organizations, allowing employees to
associate around a common goal—religious or not.230
Contract backed by threat of civil action, however, is not the hallmark
of people united by shared religious belief. It again indicates problems for
institutional autonomy in the commercial realm, where an entity can
227

See Press Release, Catholic Healthcare W., supra note 99.
See Press Release, St. Joseph’s Hosp. & Med. Ctr., supra note 98.
229
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Institutionalism, Implied Consent, and the Value of Voluntarism,
88 S. CAL. L. REV. 539, 570 (2015) (stating that “religious institutionalism amounts to a constitutionally
protected contract of sorts” founded on “the voluntary choice of individuals to join the religious
institution”).
230
Id. at 570–71 (“[W]hile the law generally does not allow individuals to waive certain statutorily
protected rights, members are granted the constitutional authority to do so when it comes to joining
religious institutions in order to promote the value of religious voluntarism.”).
228
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purchase compliance with its authority instead of winning over constituents.
The role of the dead hand in institutions to which ties have been cut proves
particularly disturbing from the perspective of voluntarism. Sales contracts
precommit a whole range of people to religious doctrine. Even if we were to
assume that the original signatories shared the seller’s religious beliefs,
future providers, administrators, owners, and patients are unlikely to do so.
Contracts requiring adherence to religious doctrine affect three groups:
business entities, individual healthcare providers, and patients. As to the first,
administrators of Catholic health systems describe transactions with other
healthcare entities with the rhetoric of voluntary choice and value alignment.
From their perspective, buyers of Catholic hospitals are “groups who agree
with us and wish to continue the type of care and types of policies” that
Catholic systems require.231 As the former president of the Catholic Health
Association put it, “When you choose us, you choose who we are.”232
Deals between sophisticated corporate healthcare chains, however, bear
little resemblance to an association based on shared values. As a conceptual
matter, thinking of corporate consolidations as voluntary associations
requires a move from aggregates of individuals to aggregates of entities. Ties
between institutions are not affective, but detached, requiring “external
coercion or inducement”—that is, legal enforcement and financial
payment.233 As a pragmatic matter, as an executive of Tenet Healthcare said,
buyers of Catholic-run hospitals have no choice but to accept the
directives.234 Catholic sellers will not consider their offers without such
commitment.235
Moreover, exit is constrained by threat of legal enforcement in a way
that belies comparisons to voluntary associations. Recall, for example, the
Caritas-Cerberus deal and its $25 million liquidated damages clause meant
to keep the for-profit owner of the formerly Catholic chain compliant with
doctrine.236 The difficulty of exit also is apparent from transactions between
Catholic and non-Catholic healthcare that went sour. For example, the

231

FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5 (quoting Karen Brandon, Ex-Catholic Hospitals Retain Restrictions,
CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 17, 2002).
232
Deanna Bellandi, What Hospitals Won’t Do for a Merger, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Sept. 29, 1998,
at 28, 28 (quoting Rev. Michael Place, president of the Catholic Health Association).
233
James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1579–81
(differentiating between individuals’ identification with or detachment from an institution and arguing
that “to secure compliance with the expectations that accompany a role distant from the self, that role
must be accompanied by some sort of external coercion or inducement”).
234
FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5.
235
Id.
236
See Caritas Christi Massachusetts Attorney General Statement, supra note 75, and accompanying
text.
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unwinding of the consortium of city-affiliated Bayfront Hospital with
Catholic partners led to multiple lawsuits.237 In another instance, Catholic and
Lutheran hospitals in Denver formed the Exempla system pursuant to a joint
operating agreement. Neither could exit unless all parties agreed to
dissolution of the corporate structure.238 Ten years later, an intractable
conflict occurred. As the agreement allowed, Lutheran was not compliant
with Catholic doctrine and provided a full range of end-of-life and
reproductive care, 239 but as a result the Catholic partner refused to invest in
facilities upgrades for the system.240 After years of litigation, Lutheran finally
succumbed, and Exempla became a fully Catholic system.241
At the provider level, contract similarly substitutes for shared faith as
the primary mechanism of compliance. Through leases, admitting privilege
agreements, employment contracts, and purchase agreements, healthcare
systems require physicians, nurses, and other healthcare providers to restrict
the care they provide patients based on religious positions they may not
share.242 Restrictions affect a large percentage of physicians.243
The use of contract seems to reflect a particular lack of alignment
between providers and institutions. Twenty percent of physicians who
practice at religious hospitals244 and a full fifty-two percent of OB–GYNs
who work in officially designated Catholic hospitals report conflicts over

237

Allison & Gilmer, supra note 48.
Cinda Becker, Exempla Board Opposes Deal, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Oct. 29, 2007, at 8, 8.
239
Id.
240
Joe Carlson, Offering Salvation: Ascension, Equity Firm Forge Deal They Say Could Save
Catholic Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/
20110221/MAGAZINE/110219947 [https://perma.cc/TJ9V-PTK8].
241
Id.
242
See, e.g., ERDs, supra note 20, at 12 (“Catholic health care services must adopt these Directives
as policy [and] require adherence to them within the institution as a condition for medical privileges and
employment . . . .”); Ungar, supra note 221 (describing a physician group departure from a healthy system
after the purchase agreement resulted in religious restrictions on birth control); ELENA N. COHEN &
ALISON SCLATER, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CENT., TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES: USING CONSUMER
PROTECTION LAWS TO EXPOSE INSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON REPRODUCTIVE AND OTHER HEALTH
CARE
6
(2003),
http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/TruthOrConsequences2003.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XGM9-QQ6Y] (“Catholic-owned medical office buildings sometimes require
physicians to whom they lease to honor the Directives in those private physician offices, even though the
physicians do not have any other relationship with the Catholic entity.”).
243
Forty-three percent of physicians report having practiced in an officially religiously affiliated
institution over the course of their careers, a large number of which had institutional policies of refusal.
Debra B. Stulberg et al., Religious Hospitals and Primary Care Physicians: Conflicts over Policies for
Patient Care, 25 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 725, 727 (2010).
244
Some religious hospitals do not impose restrictions; this number, therefore, may understate the
occurrence of conflicts between physicians and refusing hospitals over religious restrictions. Id.
238
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religion-based policies for patient care.245 Empirical studies show that such
disagreement persists irrespective of shared faith.246 That is, the rates of
conflict of a Catholic physician and a non-Catholic physician with a Catholic
hospital were approximately the same.
Frequently, providers do not knowingly or voluntarily seek work in
Catholic healthcare settings. In interviews in a 2010 study, OB–GYNs
reported that practice restrictions on the provision of abortion were not made
clear to them at the time of their hiring.247 Myriad examples of physicians
leading protests against Catholic acquisitions show providers encountering
religious restrictions in the context of consolidation.248
Lack of transparency in transactions between Catholic and nonCatholic entities undermines the notion that providers voluntarily embrace
Catholic restrictions. In many deals between Catholic hospitals and secular
corporations, terms went undisclosed.249 In some cases, administrators
proved unwilling to clarify which services were affected, even after a sale.250
In numerous instances, institutions assured providers and the public that
services would continue only to subsequently limit them in accordance with
religious doctrine.251 Even where the terms of the agreement were made clear,
the Catholic contracting party (at least theoretically) could change the
religious terms unilaterally, because agreements typically call for adherence
to future amendments to, or new interpretations of, the directives.252
245
Debra B. Stulberg et al., Obstetrician–Gynecologists, Religious Institutions, and Conflicts
Regarding Patient-Care Policies, 207 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 73.e1, 73.e4 (2012).
246
Stulberg et al., supra note 243, at 728 (“Neither religious affiliation nor physician-institution
congruence was significantly associated with having experienced conflict with religiously affiliated
institutions.”).
247
Lori Freedman et al., Obstacles to the Integration of Abortion into Obstetrics and Gynecology
Practice, 42 PERSP. SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 146, 148–50 (2010) (summarizing qualitative
interviews with thirty OB–GYNs).
248
See, e.g., Fogel & Rivera, supra note 72, at 725–26 (discussing the purchase of the sole
community hospital in Gilroy, California, by Catholic Healthcare West in response to which physicians
“organized, wrote letters to the editor, voted as a hospital staff to preserve sterilizations, and even
appealed directly to the Bishop”).
249
See REPORT OF THE KENTUCKY ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 60, at 10 (describing the
complicated “evolution of the University’s explanation of to what degree the Hospital will be subject to
the ERDs” that “has cast a cloud of vagueness and skepticism over the issue in the public eye”); Allison
& Gilmer, supra note 48 (discussing the lack of notice to the city of terms of the consortium agreement
between a Catholic and quasi-public hospital); Mueller, supra note 155 (reporting that former hospital
employees were surprised to find that the buyer had not continued to fund their pension plans).
250
See, e.g., Ungar, supra note 221 (reporting that physicians were refused specific answers to their
questions about restrictions on care and could receive no assurance that they could continue to provide
services).
251
See, e.g., Cowan, supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
252
FOGEL, supra note 64, at 5 (“The Asset Purchase Agreement for Santa Marta Hospital required
compliance with certain of the Directives, as now approved by the National Conference of Catholic
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Likewise, in converting pensions to ERISA-exempt church plans,
hospitals and healthcare systems failed to notify the estimated tens of
thousands of workers who thereby lost federal protections.253 They did not
seek employee ratification of the decisions. For example, the Hospital Center
at Orange—the last remaining hospital in a New Jersey city that once had
three—served as a secular community hospital for over 100 years.254 In 1998,
it became an affiliate of Catholic Cathedral Health System.255 In 2002, the
system applied for and received an IRS ruling converting the employee
pension plan to a church plan.256 It thus frustrated long-established
expectations, including those of workers who likely accepted lower wages
in return for a pension only to see it disappear.257
With regard to patients, theories of voluntarism prove particularly
strained. An assumption of religious exemption (and indeed of religious
institutionalism generally) has been that one had to choose to encounter
religious institutions. As Professor Robert Vischer summarizes, “Churches,
when viewed from the perch of state agnosticism, are optional pursuits. They
do not govern access to wide swaths of employment or essential goods and
services . . . .”258 From the liberal perspective as well, as Professors Richard
Schragger and Micah Schwartzman explain, “it is the very inconsequentiality
of the church for the political and social status of its members that allows it
to be so fully autonomous and free from state regulation.”259
By contrast to churches, healthcare institutions—religiously affiliated
or not—serve to meet urgent and emergent human needs and operate in a
field flush with federal and state funds. Hospital markets in particular lack
competitiveness. As a result of mergers and the formation of massive
healthcare systems, nearly half of hospital markets are highly concentrated

Bishops, and as interpreted by the local Bishop, together with all amendments thereto from time-to-time
hereafter.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
253
See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 158 (reporting that employees at the Hospital Center at Orange were
not notified when the I.R.S. issued a ruling recognizing the hospital’s pension as a “church plan”). Only
in 2011 did the IRS begin to require employers to notify employees of applications for church plan status.
Rev. Proc. 2011-44, 2011-39 I.R.B. 446.
254
Workers Covered by Church Plans Tell Their Stories, PENSION RTS. CTR.,
http://www.pensionrights.org/publications/fact-sheet/workers-covered-church-plans-tell-their-stories
[https://perma.cc/7YEG-3UR4 ].
255
Id.
256
Walsh, supra note 158.
257
PENSION RTS. CTR., supra note 254.
258
Robert K. Vischer, Do For-Profit Businesses Have Free Exercise Rights?, 21 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 369, 391 (2013) [hereinafter Vischer, For-Profit Businesses].
259
Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV.
917, 961–62 (2013) (emphasis omitted).
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(uncompetitive) and none is highly competitive.260 While religious
institutionalists frequently describe the state as monopolistic and
unavoidable, the “church,” too, may become so, especially in a market like
healthcare that is largely local.
Given the market share of official and unofficial Catholic institutions,
it is virtually inevitable that a patient will encounter major medical
institutions with religiously restricted care. Almost one-third of officially
designated Catholic hospitals serve rural populations.261 Some enjoy “a
practical, but not state-enforced, monopoly in obstetrical services.”262 Even
in urban areas, a religiously restricted hospital may be the only provider for
a large population.263 Especially where public–private partnerships are
involved, the hospital may be the only option for nonemergency care for
indigent or uninsured populations.264
Would-be patients likely do not seek out religiously affiliated hospitals
even where competitors exist. Patients tend to choose hospitals based
primarily on where their physicians practice, a choice more reflective of
geography than religion.265 Insurance plans often constrain patients’
options266 and can be expected to continue to do so as the Affordable Care
Act’s exchange plans adopt narrow networks of providers.267
260

David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation, 310 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1964, 1966 (2013).
261
CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., supra note 31, at 2; see also UTTLEY & KHAIKIN, supra
note 16, at 1 (“There are 46 Catholic-restricted hospitals that are the sole community providers of shortterm acute hospital care for people living in their geographic regions.”).
262
Ham v. Holy Rosary Hosp., 529 P.2d 361, 365 (Mont. 1974); Patricia Donovan, Hospital Mergers
and Reproductive Health Care, 28 FAM. PLAN. PERSPS. 281, 281 (1996) (noting that the merger of
Leonard Hospital and St. Mary’s Hospital in Troy, New York, resulted in discontinuation of reproductive
services for “financially and medically needy population in a three-county, largely rural area”); Fogel &
Rivera, supra note 72, at 725–26 (discussing the impact on women in rural Gilroy, California, of the
purchase of the sole community hospital by Catholic Healthcare West).
263
See, e.g., Wendt, supra note 77 (observing that a for-profit secular hospital bound by religious
restrictions was “the only hospital in a large area of Chicago”).
264
Rob Boston, Emergency! How a City-Owned Hospital in Florida Wound Up Operating Under
the Catholic Bishops’ Control and What Americans United and Its Allies are Doing About It, CHURCH &
ST. (Oct. 2000), https://www.au.org/church-state/october-2000-church-state/featured/emergency
[https://perma.cc/5S33-TLL3] (alleging that following the city hospital’s participation in a consortium
with a Catholic hospital, a woman whose sonogram revealed that her fetus had no bladder or kidneys and
severely under-developed lungs was refused an abortion and had to carry to term a fetus that survived for
thirty minutes).
265
Debra B. Stulberg et al., Tubal Ligation in Catholic Hospitals: A Qualitative Study of Ob–Gyns’
Experiences, 90 CONTRACEPTION 422, 427 (2014).
266
Id. at 426 (reporting that a plaintiff’s insurance plan covered only the local Catholic hospital,
requiring her to wait to switch insurers and undergo a second surgery rather than receive a tubal ligation
following her delivery).
267
See, e.g., John Geyman, High Deductibles and Narrow Networks: The Achilles Heel of the ACA’s
Health Insurance, HUFFINGTON POST (published Dec. 22, 2015, 1:43 PM; updated Dec. 22, 2016),
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Moreover, public polling shows that women do not expect even
Catholic-designated hospitals to refuse care for religious reasons; the
majority anticipates finding a full range of reproductive health services
regardless of religious affiliation, and 45% believe they would be able to
obtain medical services that go against Catholic religious teachings.268 A
smaller study found that a majority of women “expected that their
gynecologist would provide the range of family planning care surveyed”
regardless of the religious or secular nature of the institution: “[o]ver 90% of
participants expected to receive short- and long-acting reversible
contraceptive methods” at a Catholic facility.269
As hospitals merge and affiliate with one another, potential patients or
employees may not even recognize that a facility is religiously affiliated.270
Catholic restrictions must be followed in “St. Luke’s Episcopal Health
System” and “Jewish Hospital.”271 While hospitals linked to the Catholic
Church through sponsorship agreements appear on official rosters of
Catholic hospitals, hospitals that comply with restrictions through
partnerships or following sales go unidentified. Once sold to a secular buyer,
formerly Catholic hospitals may no longer retain any outward sign of
religiosity. Across categories of institutions (whether officially religiously
designated or zombie hospitals), hospitals do not advertise the services they
do not provide. Yet the vast majority of women want to know this
information.272 Determining whether a hospital (or physicians’ group or other
facility) adheres to religious doctrine proves no easy feat, even for the most
informed observers of religious healthcare.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-geyman/high-deductibles-and-narr_b_8862762.html
[https://perma.cc/RKR6-5UCD] (“Narrow networks have become endemic under the ACA . . . .”).
268
BELDEN RUSSONELLO & STEWART, RELIGION, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH AND ACCESS TO
SERVICES: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF WOMEN 1 (2000) (produced for Catholics for a Free Choice),
http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/
2000religionreproductivehealthandaccesstoservices-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/53U4-7WNP].
269
Maryam Guiahi et al., Are Women Aware of Religious Restrictions on Reproductive Health at
Catholic Hospitals? A Survey of Women’s Expectations and Preferences for Family Planning Care,
90 CONTRACEPTION 429, 431 (2014).
270
St. Thomas Health Renaming Baptist, Other Hospitals, WSMV (published Jul. 11, 2013, 5:20
AM; updated July 25, 2013, 5:20 AM), http://www.wsmv.com/story/22812676/st-thomas-expected-torename [https://perma.cc/VR44-47TF] (reporting on the renaming of Baptist Hospital to Saint Thomas
Midtown because, after 11 years, “most people don’t know the systems are affiliated”). Other rebranded
hospitals include Middle Tennessee Medical Center, Hickman Community Hospital, and the Hospital for
Spinal Surgery.
271
UTTLEY ET AL., supra note 31, at 8.
272
Lori R. Freedman et al., Religious Hospital Policies on Reproductive Care: What Do Patients
Want to Know?, 218 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 251.e1, 251.e1 (2017) (reporting that 80.7% of
women want to know about religious restrictions on care).
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Concerns over the creation of monopolies, lack of voluntarism, and
absence of transparency and choice exist even with regard to officially
designated Catholic hospitals. But when institutions adopt religion for
commercial gain, countervailing values of institutional exemption—such as
the religious liberty of any particular individuals or the autonomy of any
identifiable church—are absent.
D. The End of Religious Exemption in Commerce?
The spread of religion in commerce poses a crisis for the religious
institutionalism that seemed triumphant post-Hosanna Tabor. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby began to expose the cracks in
the foundation of religious institutionalism. In that case, a multibilliondollar, for-profit corporation with tens of thousands of employees gained a
right to the free exercise of religion and, indeed, to exemption from
otherwise-applicable laws under RFRA, equal to other religious
institutions.273 Dismissing the possibility that religious identity might spread
through the corporate world, the Court opined that “the idea that unrelated
shareholders—including institutional investors with their own set of
stakeholders—would agree to run a corporation under the same religious
beliefs seems improbable.”274 The healthcare industry shows that the Court
was mistaken.
Through contract, for-profit and nonprofit, commercial and
noncommercial, and sacred and secular institutions can become newly
religious. Defined so broadly, the religious institution seems to lose whatever
special character it once had. Several proponents of robust institutional
exemptions have themselves begun to warn that “the expansion of autonomy
to include for-profits threatens to dilute the entire doctrine, which could
result in the loss of protections for churches on core matters of identity and
mission.”275 Across institutions, courts may renounce their historical
disengagement from definitional questions with regard to religion. They may
inquire more deeply into the character of institutions and limit constitutional
and statutory exemptions.
As the category of religious institution broadens, traditional doctrinal
deference to claims of religion comes under strain. As a matter of black letter
273

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
Id. at 2774.
275
Carmella, After Hobby Lobby, supra note 199, at 381; see also Robinson, supra note 199, at 231
(“If judges are forced to choose between letting everyone in a broad institutional category have sovereign
rights or no one, they will inevitably choose no one.”); Vischer, For-Profit Businesses, supra note 258,
at 387 (“[T]he legitimate public policy concerns raised by for-profit businesses as free exercise claimants
could diminish protections for all free exercise claimants, including churches, unless sensible distinctions
based on corporate form are drawn.”).
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law, the Establishment Clause prohibits “excessive entanglement” between
the government and religious actors.276 Courts thus refrain from resolving
doctrinal controversies and interfering in ecclesiastical disputes.277 The
Supreme Court has deferred, for example, to authorities of hierarchical
churches in particular as to the proper ownership of church property,
leadership, and administration.278 Several judges have suggested that even
distinguishing between secular and religious activities or products might
result in extensive entanglement of government in religious affairs.279 This
“Establishment Clause Creep,” as Professors Michael Helfand and Barak
Richman call it, has meant “a growing tendency by courts to interpret the
Establishment Clause expansively to preclude adjudication of co-religionist
disputes that, at their core, are commercial in nature.”280
The case study of healthcare provides additional evidence of such creep.
In evaluating ERISA church plans, a number of lower courts refused to
inquire into the religious identity of healthcare systems, including those that
bring together religious and nonreligious hospitals.281 Inquiring further into
religious convictions, one court said, would “run afoul of the First
Amendment” and require courts to “delve into the doctrinal particulars of
Catholic orthodoxy.”282 When employees disputed the designation of
Ascension’s pension as a church plan given its lack of control by the Catholic
Church and its for-profit ventures, another district court decided that its
consideration of this argument was “prohibited by the Constitution.”283 The
276

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971).
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714 n.8 (1976) (“Civil judges
obviously do not have the competence of ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the ‘law’ that governs
ecclesiastical disputes . . . .”); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) (“It is not to
be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious
faith of [church] bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.”).
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Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 697–98, 710 (noting that deference to church decisions over property
“appl[y] with equal force to church disputes over church polity and church administration”); Watson,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724–27.
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Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,
483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[D]etermining whether an activity
is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This results in considerable ongoing
government entanglement in religious affairs.”); Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 730 (9th
Cir. 2011) (indicating that any test of religious exemption under Title VII that “take[s] into account the
‘religious’ or ‘secular’ nature of a particular product or service” would mean “venturing into this
constitutional minefield”).
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Helfand & Richman, supra note 12, at 776; see also Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 912 (2009) (“In many—and perhaps an increasing number of—instances,
religion overlaps with the commercial sphere and courts are obligated to determine whether or not to
adopt an entirely hands-off approach simply because the specter of religion lurks on the horizon.”).
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See, e.g., Medina v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 147 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1203 (D. Colo. 2015).
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Id. at 1202.
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Overall v. Ascension, 23 F. Supp. 3d 816, 832 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
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court invoked the autonomy-based arguments of religious institutionalists,
saying that “[t]he First Amendment creates a protected zone for churches to
decide these issues of religious doctrine free from government intrusion.”284
Out of fear of entanglement, courts also have disregarded the conflicts
that institutions with dual religious identities create.285 In Medina v. Catholic
Health Initiatives, for example, a fifty–fifty joint venture between Catholic
and Adventist Health Systems was granted a church plan exemption on the
basis of the venture’s association with the Catholic Church.286 One religion
subsumed the other. The court proved unwilling to inquire into religiosity
even though the institution had a dual-faith identity.
While courts cannot resolve questions of religious doctrine,287 they also
hesitate to inquire into the importance of belief to a religion. They rarely
examine plaintiffs’ sincerity or consistency outside of the context of
prisoners’ demands for exemption.288 For example, with regard to RFRA,
which requires that plaintiffs have a sincere religious belief and that their
free exercise be substantially burdened in order to shift the burden of proof
to the government, courts may simply defer to plaintiffs. Indeed, after Hobby
Lobby, courts may have to accept a plaintiff’s assertion that a law
substantially burdens its religion—ultimately permitting a religious objector
to subject regulation to strict scrutiny based on its word alone.289
Having endorsed this hands-off approach from courts (and legislatures),
religious institutionalists should be wary of widening the category of
religious institution. Extended beyond houses of worship, the category of
religious institutions becomes unstable. As Professor Zoë Robinson
observes, when borderline institutions gain the same footing as core religious
institutions, “the purposes for the special recognition of religious institutions
under the First Amendment become blurred.”290 In turn, the incapacity of
284
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Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1991)
(concluding that a hospital was entitled to the ministerial exception under the Constitution in part because
two churches of different faith traditions nominated the board of directors and had to approve changes to
the articles of association).
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Medina, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1203.
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See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) (“[I]t is not
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker
more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
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Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over Religious Property,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1847–52 (1998) (discussing “The Origin of a ‘Hands-Off’ Approach”).
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134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014) (finding the contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial burden on
the plaintiffs’ beliefs in part because “the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the
religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable)”).
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civil authorities to intervene—whether framed as institutional sovereignty or
hands-off doctrine—“begins to look significantly more troubling.”291
Today, courts might rethink deferring to a religious institution (or to the
Church) on the issue of religious identity. As this Article demonstrates, some
hospitals have disaffiliated with the Vatican but remain sponsored by an
order of women religious.292 Others have been acquired by institutional forprofit investors but retain their official Catholic designation.293 Others are
acknowledged to be secular but nonetheless are bound to follow Catholic
doctrine.294 Granting these institutions statutory license or constitutional
autonomy to avoid the state’s power undermines other societal goals and
constitutional constraints.
ERISA litigation provides some evidence that courts will reject the
hands-off approach and narrow the exemption when institutions overreach.
The Ninth Circuit, for example, explicitly rejected the hands-off argument
of a healthcare system that sought to set up church plans independent of
churches. Dignity Health had argued that “the determination whether an
organization qualifies as a church requires a forbidden inquiry into matters
of religious doctrine,” barred by the Establishment Clause.295 The Ninth
Circuit firmly disagreed.296 It further concluded that, regardless of whether a
church’s organizational form is a matter of “internal church decision,”
ERISA’s church plan exemption permits any church the freedom to “operate
their agencies under the same organizational structure as their churches” or
to separate them.297 In other words, a church can organize so as to make its
associated entities eligible for church plan status. Having failed to do so,
however, it could not then claim exemption.
Lower federal courts recently have become wary of the effects of
religious institutionalism in commerce in the ERISA context. In the past,
they tended to avoid constitutional questions by interpreting the statute to
require that only a church, as opposed to an affiliated hospital, could
establish a church plan—an approach the Supreme Court brought to a halt in
2017. For example, the Seventh Circuit rejected the church plan status of a
healthcare system employing over 33,000 people and affiliated with both the
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Rollins v. Dignity Health, 830 F.3d 900, 912 (9th Cir. 2016), rev’d on other grounds, Advocate
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
296
Id. (stating that “such a determination does not require this sort of inquiry”).
297
Id.
292

982

112:929 (2018)

Zombie Religious Institutions

United Church of Christ and the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.298
The court observed that the system “wishes to push the meaning of the
exemption to include more organizations, and many more at that,” contrary
to ERISA’s central goal of “protect[ing] workers who have invested their
retirement savings into employer-run financial plans.”299 A district court in a
similar case observed that allowing any tax-exempt organization to
“establish its own pension plan, maintain it, and then employ the church plan
exemption by purporting to be controlled by or associated with a church”
would create a slippery slope, contrary to Congress’s goal of promoting
workers’ interests.300 As another district court said, this “suggested
interpretation would reflect a perfect example of an exception swallowing
the rule.”301
However, in 2017, the Supreme Court reversed these decisions in
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton.302 Justice Elena Kagan, writing
for a unanimous Court, concluded that ERISA does authorize entities other
than churches to establish church plans.303 Plans established by “hospitals
themselves—not by a church,” could qualify for exemption from ERISA’s
requirements.304
Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred to express concern over such a
wide-ranging religious exemption. She wrote, “[T]he Court holds that scores
of employees—who work for organizations that look and operate much like
secular businesses—potentially might be denied ERISA’s protections.”305 In
particular, she said, the multibillion-dollar corporations operating for-profit
subsidiaries and competing with secular companies “bear little resemblance”
to the church-related entities that Congress considered in enacting the current
church plan definition.306
Given the Court’s acceptance of a broadly defined exemption for
churches and their associates, the pressure will build to circumscribe the
category of entities adequately “associated” with churches so as to qualify
for ERISA exemption. Recall that ERISA requires an “association” with a
church, focusing on whether an entity shares “common religious bonds and
298
Stapleton v. Advocate Health Care Network, 817 F.3d 517, 520–21, 532 (7th Cir. 2016), rev’d,
Advocate Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652 (2017).
299
Id. at 526.
300
Kaplan v. Saint Peter’s Healthcare Sys., No. 13-2941 (MAS)(TJB), 2014 WL 1284854, at *6
(D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014).
301
Rollins v. Dignity Health, 19 F. Supp. 3d 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
302
137 S. Ct. at 1657, 1663.
303
Id. at 1656.
304
Id.
305
Id. at 1663 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
306
Id.

983

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

convictions with that church.”307 Courts are likely to be called upon to
examine hospitals’ ties to churches more closely.308 Similarly, as Justice
Sotomayor suggested, courts might interpret ERISA so as to exclude plans
operated by hospital benefits committees on the ground that they are not
principal-purpose organizations.309
As contract undercuts the rationales for exemption (or the specialness
of religion), legislatures, regulators, and courts may police the category of
religious institution. They might, for example, prohibit contracts that
continue religious identity. Alternatively, presented with claims of entities
remote from the core church, courts may scrutinize religious claims more
closely and engage with the meaning of “religion” directly. Expanding
religious rights in commerce ultimately may result in less autonomy for all
institutions—from churches to charitable organizations to for-profit
corporations.310
Insofar as legislative or regulatory definitions of religious institutions
are problematic, policymakers may more carefully circumscribe statutory
definitions. For example, Maine grants an exemption to a “religious
corporation, association or organization” from employment, housing, and
education antidiscrimination law but excludes “[a]ny for-profit organization
owned, controlled or operated by a religious association or corporation.”311
Faced with the prospect of religious for-profit entities, legislators may
impose an explicit requirement of nonprofit or charitable status.
307
29 U.S.C. § 1002(33)(C) (2012) (defining an organization eligible to participate in church plans
exempted from ERISA as one “associated with a church or a convention or association of churches”
where the organization “shares common religious bonds and convictions with that church or convention
or association of churches”).
308
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example of how this might work, see Chronister v. Baptist Health, 442 F.3d 648, 652 (8th Cir. 2006),
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309
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effecting ERISA’s broad remedial purposes.” (citation omitted)).
310
See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 478 (1985) (arguing that a broad reading of the First Amendment may undermine its core protection
in times of crisis); Philip Hamburger, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 885 (2004) (“[T]he Court for
decades defined the First Amendment right of free exercise so broadly as to include religiously motivated
departures from law . . . . [I]n the wake of this experiment, the Court conditions free exercise on
government interests, even in cases involving penalties on religion.”); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of
Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 654–55 n.140 (1980) (noting that rights can become politically
vulnerable when interpreted expansively). But see John D. Inazu, More Is More: Strengthening Free
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ME. STAT. tit. 5, § 4553(10)(G) (2011).

984

112:929 (2018)

Zombie Religious Institutions

Courts likewise might narrowly define religious organization for
statutory and constitutional purposes. They might look for “pervasively
sectarian” institutions.312 They could consider whether the primary purpose
of the institution is the advancement of religious values or whether its
“primary activity . . . consists of voluntary gathering for prayer and religious
learning.”313 The membership of the institution and its capacity to affect
nonmembers also could prove relevant.
These strategies may require description of a religious institution,
identification of religious pursuits, or definition of religion itself.314 Defining
religious institutions—while precarious—likely involves no more
entanglement than arises when courts consider who is a minister for the
purposes of the ministerial exception.315 As Professor Kent Greenawalt has
argued, courts must “sometimes decide whether a claim, activity,
organization, purpose, or classification is religious.”316 The Hobby Lobby
Court seems to invite such inquiry. Courts now must adjudicate whether any
particular for-profit corporation is sufficiently “religious” to exercise
religion under RFRA.317
To the extent that contract drives expansion of exemption, lawmakers
could place limits on the duration or scope of religious contract terms.
California, for example, recently prohibited the practice of binding new and
future owners to religious doctrine.318 A hospital, once sold, may not retain
its religious identity. Similarly, as religious organizations claim a right under
RFRA to require contracting parties (such as insurance companies) to abide
by their own religious tenets (as with regard to contraception), limitations
may be in order.319 Professor Laycock, for example, proposes courts adopt a
312
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rule that “[r]eligious objectors are not entitled to exemptions for secular
entities they deal with at arm’s length.”320
These proposals highlight the interrelationship between exemption and
contract. California’s statute, for example, resolves the problem of zombie
religious hospitals but fails to confront the dilemma of second-order affiliate
institutions. Once religious commercial institutions are granted an
exemption, contract inevitably plays a role in defining the contours of the
institution. Limiting particular contracts does not tell us where, assuming a
fixed core, the institution’s boundaries lie.
As long as exemptions operate in a commercial space and have value,
the problem of contracting religion and zombie religious institutions
remains. For example, if nonprofit status proved determinative for
exemption, for-profit hospitals—whether Catholic- or investor-owned—
would not qualify as religious institutions. In this regard, the category of
religious institution would be clear. But nominally secular nonprofit and
public partners of Catholic healthcare still might become eligible for
religious exemption through an affiliation agreement. And formerly Catholic
nonprofit hospitals with no ties to the Church also would seem to be exempt.
Once commercial entities are eligible for exemption as religious institutions,
thwarting the diffusion of religion through the market proves difficult.
Exemption still can extend to affiliates and zombie institutions.
CONCLUSION
The experience of the healthcare market destabilizes the theory that
religious institutionalism fosters pluralism and nourishes individual free
exercise. By contracting religion, institutions affiliated with other faiths and
investors devoted to profit assume a religious mantle. And religious identity
survives in zombie form. Exemption becomes the rule, and “religious
institution” loses its meaning.
With corporations claiming religious goals in commercial pursuits from
craft retail to riflescope manufacture to car sales, the pressure on institutional
exemptions is likely to increase proportionally. Employees and consumers
often have little choice but to encounter religious healthcare institutions.
People who hold different or no religious beliefs thus become subject to
religious restrictions. The example of ERISA church plans demonstrates that
religious exemptions (and objections) are not limited to so-called culture war
issues, such as contraception and abortion. Institutional carve-outs can affect
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costly worker-protective regulations—ranging from antidiscrimination
obligations to pension protections.
Contracting religion—and the distinct problems it creates for law and
theory—may extend beyond the healthcare industry. An array of nonprofit
parachurch organizations has sprung up.321 Some such entities lack formal
financial or hierarchical ties to an established religious body or church.322
Like healthcare facilities, they often offer goods and services in competition
with secular or for-profit entities. Well-established churches increasingly
depart from the nonprofit charitable model in investing in commercial
entities.323 For-profit corporations unaffiliated with any church seek to join
religion and commerce in a variety of sectors.324 As religion and profit
combine across industries, contracts may spread religious compliance and
identity. Zombie religious institutions may emerge across the marketplace.
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